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Abstract 
An organisation’s strategic objectives are used as the basis for risk assessment, 
under normal (or inflated) circumstances. These risks are then reported, managerial 
decisions are formed and a risk management framework is developed in order to 
retain a “no surprise” project operation status. Traditionally though, it has been found 
that a category of external risk, political risks specifically, have been considered 
fairly informally by project managers, due to their ever changing and difficult to 
quantify nature - a common practice for these type of risks in activity-based costing 
is to increase the variance while estimating the performance of the activities in the 
project. 
However, this method is no longer sufficient, and probabilistic risk analyses 
are needed to deal with political risks, such as external disruptive events, that can 
deeply affect project cost, time and performance. The specific aim of this research is 
to explore and identify political risks on a large infrastructure project in an 
exaggerated environment and to ascertain whether sufficient objective information 
can be gathered by project managers in order to be able to utilise risk modelling 
techniques. 
During the study, the author proposed a new definition of political risk; ‘Any 
change directed from the hierarchy of control that alters the expected outcome and 
value of a given economic action by changing the probability of achieving business 
objectives’ 
The chosen project for study is the Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project 
(NJHP).  This large infrastructure project is carefully chosen with specific reference 
to Bent Flyvberg (2006), who stated that a carefully chosen experiment, case and/or 
experience can lead to the critical case, where one case may be able to provide 
sufficient evidence to justify an argument.  
NJHP is a run of the river hydroelectric generation project that is located in the 
vicinity of Muzaffarabad in the territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K). This 
large infrastructure project diverts the Neelum river water through a tunnel, into a 
power house and out falling into Jhelum River. 
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The project has experienced significant delays, funding issues and political 
disputes with regards to the Indus River Treaty signed between India and Pakistan.  
Based on the detailed project study and the specific project accounts, twenty 
political risks were found for the Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric project – some which 
had already caused an effect on the cost, time and performance. 
Objective project information was then obtained to model these risks using a 
probabilistic model. Two basic principles were used for the basis of the probabilistic 
risk assessment; the principle of decomposition and Bayes probabilistic principle. It 
was outside of the scope of this research to determine the priori and conditional 
probability data for a full set of scenarios, thus the posterior probability of the 
identified risks was only used, assuming that single risks were mutually independent. 
By implementing the probabilistic model and costs derived for each of the 
identified risks, a total amount of almost USD$596 million dollars was determined to 
be the impact of the identified risks on the Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project 
(NJHP). 
The research question however still remained – was it possible for project 
managers to obtain all the relevant objective data to run the probabilistic models? A 
quick look at the analysis showed that the majority of the information was derived 
from experts, who were on-site and had been on the project since its beginning.  
An analysis of the impact of subjectivity in the data provided by experts 
showed that the probabilistic model loses its robustness and ability to assist project 
managers in real life – shown in the study by implementing a small change to 
conditional probabilities during the different design phases, resulting in a change of 
over USD$250 Million of cost variance. 
The answer to the research problem is that, although conditional and priori 
probabilities are determined with experts, to the authors’ belief, they are at best a 
guess – simply due to the nature of political risks. It seems that although the vast 
majority of objective data, such as costs, delays and impacts can be obtained 
objectively for the use of a probabilistic model to predict the impact to a project from 
political risks, the requirement of conditional and priori probabilities from expert 
opinions cannot be considered objective data, resulting in a model that may or may 
not be completely realistic. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The management of risks associated with-in an engineering project is 
imperative for achieving its goals and reducing costs that may occur unexpectedly to 
an organisation or firm. The basic “no surprises” mission of risk management has 
been increasingly adopted by the majority of engineering firms and has undergone 
rapid development over the past decade (IRM 2002). This introduction chapter 
outlines the background and context of the research that stems from the ever 
evolving nature of risk management and highlights the purpose of this study. The 
significance and scope of this research is then emphasised before an outline of the 
remaining chapters of this thesis 
1.1 BACKGROUND 
Current risk management procedures for infrastructure projects are based on 
the risk assessment through analysis and evaluation of an organisations strategic 
objectives (IRM 2002) based on normal (or inflated) circumstances (Palomo, Insua 
and Ruggeri 2007). These risks are then reported, managerial decisions are formed 
and a risk management framework is then developed in order to retain the “no 
surprise” project operation status (Saqib, Farooqui and Lodi 2008). 
However, according to Jesus Palomo et al. (2007) this method is no longer 
sufficient, and probabilistic risk analyses are needed to deal with external disruptive 
events that can deeply affect project cost, time and performance. Traditionally 
however, these external risks have been considered fairly informally by project 
managers (Tatikonda and Rosenthal 2000; Asher 1993). As an example, a common 
practice in activity-based costing is to increase the variance while estimating the 
performance of the activities included in the project. However, Asher (1993) shows 
that this practice may be a main contributor to cost overruns. A well-known project 
forecasting failure, like that of the construction of the Opera House in Sydney, which 
was forecasted in 1957 to take 6 years and AUD$7.2 Million, was finished after 16 
years with an actual cost of AUD$102 Million in 1973 (equivalent to ~AUD$860 
Million in 2012). 
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The cost and time overruns for these large projects have several potential 
external risk sources that are often not considered; and one noted to be most difficult 
to identify and model, is political risks - especially for large infrastructure projects 
conducted in already  politically unstable countries - where the effect of political 
risks on the projects predicted cost, time and performance, can be notably 
exaggerated (Abercrombie, Hill and Turner 1984) (Jamil, Mufti and Khan 2008; 
Saqib, Farooqui and Lodi 2008). 
1.2 CONTEXT 
Risk management is an important step within the life cycle of a large 
infrastructure project. The Asset Management Council (AMC) uses both a Capability 
Assurance and Technologies Model to visualise the Asset Management process, as 
shown in Figure 1 below – highlighting that Systems Engineering is the tool used to 
provide a solution that meets the stakeholder demands. The very well documented 
and very well standardised process of systems engineering states its objective in the 
Electronics Industry Association (EIA) standard 632 as the “translation of a set of 
stakeholder requirements to a balanced and verified solution”.  To achieve the design 
solution, concept designs undergo a validation process that requires a Risk 
Management Plan – essentially to remove the high risk that may be evident in the 
conceptual solution.  
 
Figure 1: Technologies Model 
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The International Standards Organisation (ISO) document ISO 31000:2009 
outlines the principals and guidelines for implementing Risk Management. The 
standard requires the establishment of the external context in order to ensure that the 
objectives and concerns of external stakeholders are considered when developing 
risk criteria. It is based on the organisation-wide context, but with specific details of 
legal and regulatory requirements, stakeholder perceptions and other aspects of risks 
specific to the scope of the risk management process. ISO 31000:2009 lists political 
aspects as a possible factor to consider when establishing the external context. 
Having said that though - identifying and accounting for every risk is adequately 
described in the Handbook HB 436:2004 Risk Management Guidelines as “usually 
not cost-effective or even desirable”. 
Political risk management has been a widely addressed subject since the 1970s 
(Conway 2013), but the techniques used to identify, account for and manage these 
risks have evolved significantly over the years.  
Jesus Palomo et al. (2007) suggest that globalisation of the economy, 
competitive markets and increasingly hazardous environments have forced 
organisations to take riskier approaches – and believes that external events that may 
abruptly change project cost, duration and performance need to be modelled using a 
probabilistic approach. This approach focuses both on inferences about events’ 
probabilities and on their impacts on project performance – through what Palomo 
calls ‘gravity models’. 
Nicholas Dulac (2007) states in his PhD that traditional risk assessment 
techniques are not suited to handle complex software-intensive systems, complex 
human-machine interactions and systems-of-systems with distributed decision-
making that cut across both physical and organisational boundaries. Dulac states that 
to perform effective risk management in complex systems, it is necessary to use a 
more inclusive approach that encompasses the technical aspects of a system, as well 
as the managerial, organisational, social and political aspects of the system and its 
environment.  
The focus of this research and the authors concern with regards to these 
approaches is whether adequate objective data can be collected to produce models 
that are sufficiently accurate for industrial use. 
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1.3 PURPOSES 
The specific aim of this study is to explore and identify political risks on a 
large infrastructure project in an exaggerated environment and to ascertain whether 
sufficient objective information can be gathered by project managers in order to be 
able to utilise risk modelling techniques identified above. 
The practical outcome of this research should be a list of political risk factors 
that can potentially adversely affect the cost, time and performance of a large 
infrastructure project in a politically unstable country. The outcome will also address 
the ability of project managers to be able to identify those political risks and manage 
them without or without the use of probabilistic modelling approaches. 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE, SCOPE AND DEFINITIONS 
As trillions of dollars are globally invested every year, investors are interested 
to know the political risks affecting their project before their investment. Whether the 
outcomes of the forecasting models are realistic or not, serves as the significance of 
this research – assisting investors to understand how much trust to place within these 
models.  
The scope of this research is to test a relevant probabilistic model against 
changes that are directed from the hierarchy of control within a large infrastructure 
project. An analysis of whether the time, cost and performance parameters can be 
realistically obtained for the forecasting model, will be done on completion of the 
field study. 
1.5 THESIS OUTLINE 
The remaining chapters of this thesis are as follows; Chapter 2 conducts a 
detailed literature review of the current work done in this area and critically evaluates 
it. It also identifies any literature gaps that are found. Chapter 3 details the research 
design – it describes the chosen infrastructure project to study and the methodology 
undertaken to obtain the required information. Chapter 4 details the results obtained 
from the research followed by a full discussion and analysis of the results in Chapter 
5. Chapter 6 concludes the research, addresses the practical implications and ends 
with some final recommendations. 
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
This chapter discusses the range and content of the literature that was reviewed 
to formulate the research problem. This literature review also informed the methods 
chosen in Chapter 3: and the discussion in Chapter 5:. 
The literature review has been grouped into seven areas. Section 2.1 explores 
the definition of political risks and how it is applied in industry at the moment. 
Section 2.2 defines what is considered to be infrastructure and what parties are 
generally involved in large infrastructure projects – as these parties will be addressed 
in the research. Section 2.3 details which countries are considered to be politically 
stable and which are not – allowing for the selection of an exaggerated environment 
to conduct the research study in. Existing literature that attempts to or partially 
identifies political risk factors is then discussed in section 2.4. Section 2.5 and 2.6 
then introduce relevant concepts from system dynamics modelling and probabilistic 
modelling of external risk factors respectively. 
2.1 POLITICAL RISK 
Jesus Palomo et al. (2007) agree with Ian Bremmer and Jr Samuel DiPiazza ( 
2006) when both state that globalisation has bred a culture of acceptance to ever-
greater political-risk exposure. Observing the Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
statistics provides a clear indicator of globalisation – as USD$1.4 Trillion was 
invested globally in 2012 alone (Bertrand and Kothe 2013). As political risk is an 
important component in the capital budgeting process for any FDI (Clark 1997), 
considerable work has been done in the area of Political risk and its management. 
This section provides a critical literature review of the definition of Political 
Risk and the various concepts floated around political risk management from the 
1970s to date. The expanse of existing strategies to manage political risk and 
political risk factor identification is addressed in Section 2.4. Probabilistic models 
used as a strategy to help measure the impact or effect of political risks, are further 
addressed in Section 2.6. 
Ephraim Clark (1997) has aptly said: ‘defining political risk can be a major 
problem. In spite of the widespread coverage of the subject, political risk has not 
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received a clear cut definition’. Ian Bremmer and Jr Samuel DiPiazza (2006) claim 
political risk as ‘any political change that alters the expected outcome and value of a 
given economic action by changing the probability of achieving business objectives’ 
very similarly defined by David Schmidt (1986) as ‘the application of host 
government policies that constrain the business operations of a given foreign 
investment’. Charles Kennedy Jr (1988) on the other hand states that ‘political risk 
can be defined as the risk of strategic, financial or personnel loss for a firm because 
of such nonmarket factors as macroeconomic and social policies (fiscal, monetary, 
trade, investment, industrial, income, labour and developmental) or events related to 
political instability (terrorism, riots, coups, civil war and insurrection)’. The 
pioneering work done on this subject by Franklin Root in 1973 further classifies said 
defined risks into three categories; Transfer Risk, Operational Risk and Ownership-
Control Risk. Transfer risk stems from the government policies that restrict the 
transfer of capital, payments, products, technology and persons into or out of the host 
country. Operational risk arises as a result of host government policies, regulations 
and administrative procedures that directly constrain the management and 
performance of local operations in productions, marketing, finance and other 
business functions. Finally, ownership-control risks are brought about as a result of a 
host government policy or action that inhibits ownership or control of the local 
operations of an international company. 
Edward Conway (2013) states that the single overarching priority when it came 
to identifying political risks in a given country, was the impact that it had on a firm’s 
ability to operate – impact being the key word. It is also generally recognised, that 
political risks evolve through time in reaction to countless events on the 
international, national, regional and personal levels (Clark 1997) – and since many of 
these events are random in nature, the evolution of political risks is at least to some 
extent random in itself. 
Ian Bremmer and Jr Samuel DiPiazza (2006) address the fact that countries 
with lower political stability have a larger tendency to contribute greater potential 
risk to a business’ overall risk profile. Changes in the regulatory environment, local 
attitudes to corporate governance, reaction to international competition, labour laws, 
and withholding and other taxes, to name but a few, may all be influenced by hard to 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 7 
discern shifts in the political landscape. Political risk even incorporates a 
government’s capacity and preparedness to respond to natural disasters. 
In the authors view, the above concepts of political risk imply a common 
aspect, as partially stated by Edward Conway (2013) and further expanded by Jesus 
Palomo et al. ( 2007) – they imply three essential questions: 
1. What can go wrong? i.e. the identification of disruptive events and their 
potential combinations that could arise during the project. 
2. What is their likelihood? i.e. the probability of said disruptive event 
occurring. 
3. What are the consequences (or impact)? i.e. an estimation of the impact-
losses associated with the identified event – in terms of additional cost, 
time delay or lower technical performance. 
However, the author believes that these definitions lack a sense of scope, 
especially given that ‘Politics’ is defined by the Collins English Dictionary (2000) as 
“the complex or aggregate of relationships of people in society, especially those 
relationships involving authority or power”. It seems odd then, to only consider the 
risks faced by a firm influenced by a country or its government’s policies. The author 
believes that the relationships of people within a project or a firm should also be 
included within this definition, as they have the same potential to add risk. 
With this in mind, the definition of political risk can be slightly altered from 
the definition presented by Ian Bremmer and Jr Samuel DiPiazza (2006) and 
proposed as: 
‘Any change directed from the hierarchy of control that alters the expected 
outcome and value of a given economic action by changing the probability of 
achieving business objectives’ 
This is the proposed definition of political risk that will be used throughout the 
remaining chapters of this thesis. 
2.2 INFRASTRUCTURE 
Now, infrastructure is defined as the basic facilities, services and equipment 
required for a country or organisation to function properly and are essential in the 
development and re-development of a country that may be under political instability 
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or war-ridden (Singer, Cruz and Bregman 2007). Since infrastructure forms the basic 
functionality of a countries services and assets, the importance of risks associated 
with governmental laws and political views becomes vital. 
The definition of infrastructure has been evolutionary and often ambiguous. 
Twenty five years ago, infrastructure was defined primarily in debates about the 
adequacy of the nation’s public works (Moteff and Parfomak 2004). A typical report 
from 1984, issued by the Council of State Planning Agencies in the United States, 
defined infrastructure as “a wide array of public facilities and equipment required to 
provide social services and support for the private sector economic activity.” 
According to the report, infrastructure included roads, bridges, water and sewer 
systems, airports, ports, and public buildings, and might also include schools, health 
facilities, jails, recreation facilities, electric power production, fire safety, waste 
disposal, and communications services (Vaughan and Pollard 1984). 
Later definitions of infrastructure defined it as the facilities, services, 
distribution networks and installations required for the functioning of a community 
or society such as water supply and treatment, solid waste facilities, energy networks, 
transportation and communication systems (Singer, Cruz and Bregman 2007). This is 
the accepted definition that will be used for the remainder of this thesis. 
Now, there are several parties involved within infrastructure projects. These 
parties can fall under one of three categories; client, consultant or contractor. 
2.2.1 Client 
The client (or customer) is referred to as the current or potential purchaser of 
an individual or organisations goods or services. Hence the client is also referred to 
as ‘the owner’. For an infrastructure project, the client will define the project 
requirements and will provide the management and resources (or funding for the 
resources) required for completion. 
2.2.2 Consultant 
The consultant is a professional individual or firm that is hired by a client for 
expert advice in a particular subject matter. In the case of an infrastructure project, a 
consultant may be involved in the detailed engineering design, management, 
construction supervision, accountancy, law (government and environmental policies) 
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and marketing or communication aspects of the project. The consultant may obtain 
further expertise by obtaining sub consultants for specific work. 
2.2.3 Contractor 
A contractor is an individual or group bound by a contractual agreement to the 
client for their services or goods. In an infrastructure project; a general contractor is 
typically responsible for the majority of the construction of civil works and 
installation of mechanical and electrical works and may also obtain further expertise 
by obtaining subcontractors for specific work. 
2.3 POLITICALLY UNSTABLE COUNTRIES 
Political instability is a complex topic in nature and cannot be defined by any 
single event or proceeding. An organisation formed by the US government; the 
Political Instability Task Force (PITF) defines four distinct types of state failure 
events in (Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2009) in order to determine a countries political 
stability. These events are revolutionary wars, ethnic wars, adverse regime changes, 
and genocides and politicides. Often, state failures are complex cases involving more 
than one distinct event type; also common are war events that have both political and 
ethnic characteristics. In general, complex events are made up of two or more 
temporally-linked wars and crises.  An in depth definition of each event is provided 
below. 
2.3.1 Wars 
Wars are a unique type of political event. Whether the war is classified as 
revolutionary or ethnic, the underlying characteristic of war is the concerted tactical 
and strategic use of organised violence in an attempt by political (and or military) 
leaders to gain a favourable outcome in an ongoing, group conflict interaction 
process (Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2009). Revolutionary and ethnic wars are both 
primarily internal, domestic, civil, intrastate (societal wars), although they are often 
internationalised to some extent as one or more of the contending groups may receive 
substantial indirect (or direct) support from foreign governments or other groups.  
Societal wars are distinguished from normal conflict processes by the use of 
organized, lethal violence; from extremist campaigns by the magnitude, intensity, 
and nature of the use of violence; and from intercommunal violence by the active 
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involvement of state authorities and the professed (or perceived) goal of the 
contending non-state group to change the established political structure. 
Wars can thus be identified as major armed conflicts between state authorities 
and mobilised oppositional groups and can be measured by the number of deaths that 
result directly from organised violence (Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2009). The 
beginning of a war is defined with the appearance of substantial armed conflict and 
ending with the disappearance of substantial armed conflict (Goldstone et al. 2005). 
Specifically; revolutionary wars are defined as episodes of violent conflict 
between governments and politically organised groups (political challengers) that 
seek to overthrow the central government, to replace its leaders, or to seize power in 
one region. To qualify as a war, the conflicts must include substantial use of violence 
by one or both parties. Ethnic wars are defined as episodes of violent conflict 
between governments and national, ethnic, religious, or other communal minorities 
(ethnic challengers) in which the challengers seek major changes in their status. 
More detail on the specification of characteristics for the parties involved can be 
found in (Goldstone et al. 2008). 
To determine the level of political instability due to wars, a number of 
magnitude scales are utilised including (Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2009); 
1. The number of active rebel combatants or activists in a political 
movement. 
2. The number of annual fatalities directly attributed to fighting, armed 
attacks, and political protest including rebel fighters and leaders, 
demonstrators, regime forces and officials, civilians massacred in war 
zones or caught in cross-fire, and victims of terrorist attacks. 
3. How much of the country is directly or indirectly affected by fighting or 
political protest in a given year. 
2.3.2 Adverse Regime Changes 
Adverse regime changes refer to the direct shift in the pattern of a country’s 
governance from open, democratic election systems towards a closed, fully 
institutionalised autocratic system. This may involve; revolutionary changes in 
political elites and the mode of governance; contested dissolution of federated states 
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or secession of a substantial area of a state by extrajudicial means; and or near-total 
collapse of central state authority and the ability to govern (Goldstone et al. 2008). 
A revolutionary change refers to the replacement of current political authorities 
by a new regime comprising of rather different governing structure, political heads of 
state, sources of authority or modes or rule. Such revolutionary changes constitute 
profound changes in the ethnic, religious, or ideological orientation of 
institutionalised regime authority. Revolutionary changes are considered adverse 
regime changes due to the requisite collapse of central authority that precedes and 
enables the establishment of the new regime and not due to a subjective comparison 
of the relative merits of the prior and post regimes. 
In the case of a contested dissolution of states the central authority may 
collapse due to internal pressures to dissolve the unity of the state and reconstitute 
authority in separate territorially-redefined administrative units, that is, new 
independent states. If a state is territorially reconstituted by legal instruments 
designed by and under the authority of the previous state, then the change is 
considered to have been accomplished via central authority and not through a 
collapse of that authority (Goldstone et al. 2008). If the political elites of the previous 
regime actively contest or resist the dissolution of the unity of the state, then the 
change is considered to be predicated on the collapse of the central authority of the 
previous state. State dissolutions are considered adverse regime changes due to the 
requisite collapse of central authority that precedes and enables the establishment of 
the successor states and not due to a subjective comparison of the relative merits of 
the prior and post change situations (Goldstone et al. 2005). 
Finally, the central authority may collapse in total or in majority, due to a fatal 
combination of internal pressures, challenges, corruption, poverty, leadership failure, 
elite or capital flight, external influences, or any other factors that may directly erode 
or undermine the political stability of authority structures. There are cases where the 
failed governance does not have an alternative at all and an extended period of chaos 
or anarchy results. A less extreme case may see a political state continue to exist but 
incapable of implementing and enforcing public policy. A governance that lacks the 
strength of authority to effectively govern at least half its sovereign obligation (that 
is, provide essential services and maintain a reasonably effective security and 
authority presence) measured in terms of population and territory, it is considered to 
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be a failed state and, thus, an considered as an adverse regime change by Monty 
Marshall et al. (2009). 
To determine the level political instability due to adverse regime changes, a 
number of magnitude scales are utilised including (Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2009); 
1. The failure of state authority in which the institutions of the central 
state are so weakened that they can no longer maintain authority or 
political order in significant parts of the country. 
2. The collapse of democratic Institutions in which democratic (or quasi-
democratic) institutions are weakened or replaced, through the use or 
threat of force, by autocratic political institutions. 
3. Violence associated with adverse regime changes. 
2.3.3 Genocides and Politicides 
Genocide and politicide events involve policies formed by governing 
authorities or their agents (or in the case of civil war, either contending authorities) 
that result in the deaths of a substantial portion of a communal group or politicised 
non-communal group. In genocides the victimised groups are defined primarily in 
terms of their communal (ethno linguistic, religious) characteristics. In politicides3, 
groups are defined primarily in terms of their political opposition to the regime and 
dominant groups (Marshall, Gurr and Harff 2009). 
In the case of genocide or politicide; a persistent, coherent pattern of 
complicity by the governing state, its agents or by a dominant social group in the 
destruction of people’s existence, in whole or part, within the effective territorial 
control of the group is evident. As the physical destruction of a people requires time 
to accomplish; it implies a persistent, coherent pattern of action. However, genocide 
and politicide may also occur in episodic attacks that occur periodically. Finally, the 
victims of genocide and politicide and considered to be unarmed civilians, not 
combatants. Certain kinds of tactics are indicative of authorities’ systematic targeting 
of non-combatants: massacres, unrestrained bombing and shelling of civilian-
inhabited areas, declaration of free-fire zones, starvation by prolonged interdiction of 
food supplies, forced expulsion (ethnic cleansing) accompanied by extreme privation 
and killings, etc. 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 13 
To determine the level of political instability due to genocide and politicide, 
the magnitude scale utilised is the annual number of deaths (Marshall, Gurr and 
Harff 2009). 
In 2005, a complete list of all state failure events for every country in the world 
from 1955 to 2004 was completed by the PITF and is provided for reference in 
(Goldstone et al. 2008). Utilising a data set, similar to the above mentioned, Ian 
Bremmer and Jr Samuel DiPiazza (2006) have produced a map of the world; 
indicating the level of political stability in each country. A portion of that map is 
shown in the figure below. 
 
 
Figure 2:   Level of political stability in Europe, Asia and Africa according to Ian Bremmer and Jr 
Samuel DiPiazza (2006) 
Figure 2 shows at least two countries that have a very low level of political 
stability and at least two more countries that have a low level of stability. Section 3.1 
discusses which one of these countries will best represent the exaggerated 
environment, in which the research should be conducted and provides further details. 
2.4 EXISTING WORK ON POLITICAL RISK FACTOR 
IDENTIFICATION  
There is a large number of works that have attempted to identify political risk 
factors on different types of projects, through either case studies of specific projects 
or generalised risk factors to be used when applying risk analysis. In as early as 
1974, Bruce Lloyd (1974) attempts to categorise the factors that lead to social, 
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political and economic instability, although he also states that nobody can be 
expected to accurately predict the future in political and social fields and that these 
variables present special problems because the nature of political change itself is 
frequently difficult to anticipate, further complicated by the fact that what is a 
political risk factor for one firm is not necessarily of any relevance to another. The 
risk factors identified by Bruce Lloyd (1974) are of eight types as below: 
1. Strong internal factions (religious/racial/language/tribal or economic) 
2. Social unrest and disorder 
3. Recent or impending independence 
4. New international alliances 
5. Forthcoming elections 
6. Extreme programmes 
7. Vested interests of local business groups 
8. Proximity to armed conflict 
 Later studies have commonly divided political risk into two categories; micro-
risk and macro-risk (Tsai and Su 2005), depending on whether the risk factors affect 
selected or overall industries. Micro-risks refers to the risk resulting from the 
political changes that affect only a selected field of business activity or foreign 
enterprises, while macro-risks refer to those resulting from political changes that 
affect overall enterprise. This fits in line with the proposed definition of political 
risks as well – where depending on where in the hierarchy of control the change 
comes from, we would classify it as a micro-risk or macro-risk. 
Relative Importance Indexing (RII) is often used to rank identified risks in 
order of their perceived importance as done in (Jamil, Mufti and Khan 2008) who 
surveyed clients, consultants and contractors to identify the following top ten most 
important perceived risks: 
1. Payment delays 
2. Foreign currency fluctuation 
3. Incompatibility of local policies with international practice 
4. Pollution and safety rules 
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5. Changes in laws and regulations 
6. Design problems 
7. Inflation and cost overrun 
8. Delays in approvals and permits from government 
9. Inadequate technical specifications in tender documents 
10. Site access and/or right of way 
Another analysis (Azhar, Farooqui and Ahmed 2008) categorised project cost 
overrun factors into three broad categories; macro-economic factors, management 
factors and business/regulatory factors. The top ten factors identified here ranked, 
fluctuation in prices of raw materials and unstable costs of manufactured materials as 
the highest impact risk factors and inappropriate government policies as the lowest 
impact risk factor. 
Probably the most successful work on identifying political risk factors was 
however done by the pioneer of this work, Franklin Root, and aptly explained by 
David Schmidt (1986) whose method for assessing the impact of a political risk 
factors was by classifying the type of investment itself, with similar techniques still 
used by Ian Bremmer and Jr Samuel DiPiazza (2006) in large corporations today. 
Franklin Root (1972) classifies political risk into three categories, as mentioned in 
Section 2.1 earlier, further broken down as below: 
1. Transfer Risks 
a. Tariffs on export 
b. Export restrictions 
c. Tariffs on imports 
d. Import quotas 
e. Dividend remittance restrictions 
f. Capital repatriation restrictions 
g. Nationality restrictions 
2. Operational Risks 
a. Price Controls 
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b. Increased Taxation 
c. Export commitments 
d. Local content requirements 
e. Local sourcing requirements 
f. Local manufacturing requirements 
g. Financing restrictions 
3. Ownership-Control Risks 
a. Geographic limitations on investment 
b. Economic sector limitations 
c. Pressure for local participation 
d. Expropriation 
e. Confiscation 
David Schmidt (1986) then categorises the type of investment as either 
conglomerates, vertical investments or horizontal investments. An investment type 
rating as shown in Table 1 is then given from 1 to 5 based on whether the investment 
is in the primary, service or industrial sectors, is science or non-science based and 
partially or wholly owned by the foreign investor.  
Table 1: assigning an investment type based on the sector, technology used and ownership David 
Schmidt (1986) 
Sector Technology Ownership Combination Investment 
Type 
Primary Non-Science based Wholly Owned 1 I 
Partially Owned 2 I 
Science based Wholly Owned 3 I 
Partially Owned 4 I 
Service Non-Science based Wholly Owned 5 II 
Partially Owned 6 II 
Science based Wholly Owned 7 II 
Partially Owned 8 II 
Industrial Non-Science based Wholly Owned 9 III 
Partially Owned 10 III 
Science based Wholly Owned 11 IV 
Partially Owned 12 V 
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This information is then all used in order to assess the impact of the political 
risk, as shown in the figure below. 
 
Figure 3: Operating mix for assessing political risk David Schmidt (1986) 
What is apparent through the review of existing work on identifying political 
risks is that a range of different risks have been identified by different works, with 
different methods of categorising and assessing their impacts. It can also be noted 
that political risk is investment or firm dependent and that some political risks 
identified for one firm or investment may not apply for others. 
Having reviewed the existing work on political risk factor identification, it is 
necessary to understand how identified political risks can be modelled to understand 
their cost impact on projects. Two well established areas of work are system 
dynamics – as a modelling application of systems engineering and probabilistic 
modelling. Both these topics are discussed in section 2.5 and 2.6 below. 
2.5 SYSTEM DYNAMICS IN SYSTEMS ENGINEERING 
System dynamics has been applied extensively to the investigation of 
development projects over several decades (Lee, ord and Joglekar 2007). The 
methodology is particularly useful in this context because of its ability to model the 
delayed information feedback, flows and accumulations of work, and non-linear 
relationships that characterise development (Cooper 1993a, 1993b, 1993c). 
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According to the review of these models by James Lynies and David Ford 
(2007), there are four main components in system dynamics for engineering projects; 
project features, re-work cycles, project control and ripple or knock-on effects. A 
short explanation of these as in (Lynies and Ford 2007) is given below. 
Project features involve modelling the specific features of a project; including 
development processes, resources, managerial mental models and decision making. 
Modelling important components of actual projects increases the ability to simulate 
realistic project dynamics and relate directly to the experiences of practicing 
managers. 
Re-work cycles refer to the work that needs to be re-done as a result of errors in 
the previous work (and perhaps re-work on re-work on re-work.. etc) (Ford and 
Sterman 1999). These errors can be due to several factors; inexperience, fatigue, lack 
of proper communication between workers or simple lack of project direction as well 
as many more. Figure 4 highlights this as below. All these factors are in themselves 
as a result of managerial decisions to “save” the projects inability to meet 
requirements and deadlines within budget.  
Project Control attempts to model the controlling feedback loops where the 
project managers attempt to close the gap between a projects actual results and 
predicted results, for delivering the project on time and in budget. This is shown in 
Figure 5.  
Ripple and Knock On Effects refers to the primary unintended consequences of 
well-intentioned project control efforts and secondary impacts that intensify the 
negative effects respectively. These can be seen in a rather complex project map, 
shown in Figure 6.  
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Figure 4: Re-work cycle as given in (Lynies and Ford 2007) 
 
The method for utilising existing system dynamic models applied to project 
management in the engineering field would have to follow a number of steps, if this 
solution method is chosen for analysis. Models such as ones in (Lynies and Ford 
2007) review general project dynamics modelled as project maps. On the other hand, 
Rahmandad Triantis et al. (2009)  review the failures of systems engineering itself 
and methods to find lack of proper project management by looking at the system 
dynamics model of a project. Using similar models to both of the above mentioned 
references as well as modelling in political factors and government effects, as shown 
in (Zamanipour 2009), a generic yet comprehensive project dynamics model will 
need to be created. 
This would involve performing a case study of an infrastructure project in a 
politically unstable country and modelling specific components of the project into the 
project dynamics model. By having more project management components in accord, 
a better overall picture can be determined for generalising the risks associated with 
infrastructure projects in unstable countries. To do this, association with at least one, 
if not several external organisations would be required in order to collect existing and 
previous project data. As the point of view of a successful project varies, as 
described in (Saqib, Farooqui and Lodi 2008) both the client and consultant points of 
view will need to be considered. 
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Figure 5: Addition of controlling feedback loops to the re-work cycle as in (Lynies and Ford 2007) 
Analysis would then require determining critical managerial decisions made 
within the researched infrastructure project that may have led to success or failure of 
certain goals within the project. The purpose of determining critical managerial 
decisions would better help identify the underlying risks within an infrastructure 
project. As mentioned by Rizwan Farooqui (2008) the project manager is cornerstone 
in any successful project, and ones considered for this study are no exception. The 
method in which critical managerial decisions will be determined is by first 
identifying specific project goals that may or may not have been met. Relative 
success or failure of a project goal is closely preceded by some managerial decision 
that can be identified through the project dynamics model created in earlier and 
specified in subsequently. 
 Chapter 2: Literature Review 21 
 
Figure 6: Policy resistance via “knock-on” effects to controlling feedback to improve schedule 
performance as in (Lynies and Ford 2007) 
 
From this, the solution would be approached by determining the possible 
project risks and identifying if political risks were a major contributor. This would be 
done by tracing the critical managerial decisions (identified in the last step) within 
the project dynamics map and determining the root cause, which in this case will be 
the possible project risks. 
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The result would be the objective determination the risks faced in infrastructure 
projects in politically unstable countries. 
2.6 PROBABILISTIC MODELLING OF EXTERNAL RISK FACTORS 
Naïve Bayes is a simple probabilistic classifier based on applying Bayes 
theorem with strong independence (Naïve) assumptions. Essentially, this means that 
the underlying probability model has a very high number of predictors; it’s an 
independent feature model. As shown in (Zhang 2004), the classifier can be easily 
derived as below. 
The probability of an example 𝐸 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … . 𝑥𝑛) being class 𝑐 is: 
𝑝(𝑐|𝐸) =
𝑝(𝐸|𝑐)𝑝(𝑐)
𝑝(𝐸)
 
𝐸is classified as the class 𝐶 = + if and only if 
𝑓𝑏(𝐸) =
𝑝(𝐶 = +|𝐸)
𝑝(𝐶 = −|𝐸)
 ≥ 1 
Where 𝑓𝑏(𝐸) is called a Bayesian Classifier. 
Now, assuming that all the attributes are independent – our naïve bayes 
classifier assumption – given the value of the class variable; that is: 
𝑝(𝐸|𝑐) = 𝑝(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … . 𝑥𝑛|𝑐) = ∏ 𝑝(𝑥𝑖, 𝑐),
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Then the resulting classifier 𝑓𝑛𝑏(𝐸) is the naïve bayes classifier. 
𝑓𝑛𝑏(𝐸) =
𝑝(𝐶 = +|𝐸)
𝑝(𝐶 = −|𝐸)
∏
𝑝(𝑥𝑖|𝐶 = +)
𝑝(𝑥𝑖|𝐶 = −)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
This type of classifier is extremely useful in the context of this research as each 
attribute in the classifier has no parent, except its class. Each attribute is independent 
and hence, more suitable to modelling the risk factors of a large infrastructure project 
– that are likely to be independent of one another apart from class. 
Jesus Palomo et al. (2006) use this technique to forecast procurement delays. 
Jesus Palomo et al. (2004) and (2007) also show Bayesian forecasting models in 
project management and verify their use. The latter introduces the concept of 
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‘gravity’ in a project; which is the sum of the impacts from risk factors (e.g. 
additional cost) or the maximum impact (e.g. time delays). This is used in order to 
determine the probability that an event will occur in the lifetime of a project and 
what ‘gravity’ it will have on the project itself. Given that 𝑞𝑖 is the probability of the 
risk factors, the total gravity of the project is given by 𝑔, and an event is noted as 𝐸, 
then: 
𝑔 = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
∗. 𝑔𝑖 + ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑗
∗ . 𝑔𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑟
∗ . 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑟 + ⋯ + 𝑞1…𝑘
∗ . 𝑔1…𝑘
𝑖≠𝑗≠𝑟𝑖≠𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1
 
Where 𝑔𝑖 is the gravity caused by the event 𝐸𝑖 only, 𝑔𝑖𝑗is the gravity caused by 
the simultaneous occurrence of the two events 𝐸𝑖 and 𝐸𝑗 and so on. 
For a given threshold level of gravity, the probability of overrunning that 
threshold can then be derived by: (Palomo, Insua and Ruggeri 2007) 
𝑃(𝑔 ≥ ?̅?) = ∑ 𝑞𝑖
∗. 𝑃(𝑔𝑖 ≥ ?̅?) + ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑗
∗ . 𝑃(𝑔𝑖𝑗 ≥ ?̅?) + ⋯ + 𝑞1…𝑘
∗ . 𝑃(𝑔1…𝑘 ≥ ?̅?)
𝑖≠𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1
 
The next steps would involve finding the probability of the risk factors 
individually and for simultaneous occurrence as well as predicting the gravity of 
those probabilities on the complete project. The predictors as provided in (Palomo, 
Insua and Ruggeri 2007) show that the posterior predictive gravity density 
approximation for 𝑔𝑖 is: 
𝜋(𝑔𝑖|𝐃) = ∫ 𝜋(𝑔𝑖|𝜃𝑖)𝜋(𝜃𝑖|𝐃)𝑑𝜃𝑖  ≃
1
𝑁
∑
1
𝜃𝑖
𝑙 𝐼[0,𝜃𝑖
𝑙]
(𝑔𝑖) 
𝑁
𝑙=1
 
These functions provide a direct method of determining the impact of risk 
factors upon an infrastructure project given the probability of a project risk event 
occurring. 
2.7 SUMMARY AND IMPLICATIONS 
In summary, several key aspects related to the research were found in the 
literature review. Notably, these included the definition of political risk and different 
risk modelling techniques. 
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Several definitions for Political risk were found in the literature reviewed, with 
all of them implying three essential questions: What can go wrong? What is their 
likelihood? And what are the consequences (or impact)? 
However, the author believed that these definitions lack a sense of scope, and 
that it seemed odd to only consider the risks faced by a firm influenced by a country 
or its government’s policies. The author believed that the relationships of people 
within a project or a firm should also be included within this definition, as they have 
the same potential to add risk. The author proposed the following definition of 
political risk after the literature review. 
‘Any change directed from the hierarchy of control that alters the expected 
outcome and value of a given economic action by changing the probability of 
achieving business objectives’ 
The implication this has on the research – is that the political risks that arise 
from within the client, contractor or consultant parties within the project will also be 
considered – as they form part of the hierarchy of control. 
Modelling important components of actual projects through a systems 
dynamics model increases the ability to simulate realistic project dynamics and relate 
directly to the experiences of practicing managers. By having more project 
management components in accord, a better overall picture can be determined for 
generalising the risks associated with infrastructure projects in unstable countries. 
Relative success or failure of a project goal is closely preceded by some managerial 
decision that can be identified through the project dynamics model.  
Probabilistic modelling has a very high number of predictors and is an 
independent feature model. The probabilistic model is used to provide a direct 
method of determining the impact of risk factors upon an infrastructure project given 
the probability of a project risk event occurring. 
Although these models exist, information on whether they have proved to be 
useful in the industry and a measure of how realistically they have benefitted 
investors and project managers is yet to be determined. The literature review 
conducted on the types of modelling techniques will assist in choosing the most 
relevant analysis method for this research. 
.  
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Chapter 3: Research Design 
This chapter discusses the design and methodology for the research. The 
chosen infrastructure project is discussed and the political situation of the country in 
which it is being built is also discussed. Laws related to the infrastructure project are 
also discussed in this chapter. 
3.1 POLITCALLY EXAGGERATED ENVIRONMENT FOR RESEARCH 
3.1.1 Politically unstable countries 
As identified in Section 2.3 earlier, only a few countries were considered to 
have low or very low political stability in the world. Of the four countries identified 
by Ian Bremmer and Jr Samuel DiPiazza (2006), the country chosen for analysis is 
Pakistan.  
The primary reason for choosing Pakistan, is that Pakistan is considered to be 
one of the ‘Next Eleven’ countries, identified by the Goldman Sachs Investment 
bank and economist Jim O’Neill as having a high potential of becoming the largest 
economies in the world – with Pakistan ranked to be the 18th largest in the world by 
2025 (O’Neill et al. 2005). 
3.1.2 Pakistan 
Pakistan is situated as shown in Figure 7 below. It is the 6
th
 most populated 
country in the world, standing at 184 Million as of 2011 (Pakistan 2011) and has 8 
territories as shown in Figure 8 below. 
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Figure 7: Location of Pakistan 
 
 
Figure 8: Territories of Pakistan 
 
The below section discusses the political instability in Pakistan.  
3.1.2.1 Political instability in Pakistan  
Since the formation of Pakistan in 1947, having been split up from India as 
East and West Pakistan, several events have occurred over the past years that have 
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led to its level of political instability. Obtained from (Goldstone et al. 2008), these 
are outlined in Table 2. 
Complex events mentioned in the table, are made up of two or more temporally 
linked wars and crises. If events overlap or if five years or less separate the end of 
one event and the onset of the next distinct event, they are combined into complex 
events. 
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Table 2: List of events signifying Pakistan’s political instability (Goldstone et al. 
2008) 
 
Pakistan: Historical State Armed Conflicts and Regime Crises 
Regime 
Change 
10/1958 - 
10/1958 
Decade-long experiment with parliamentary 
and presidential systems ends when democratic 
constitution is abrogated, political parties 
dissolved and government handed over to 
coalition of military officers and bureaucrats. 
Complex 03/1971 - 
12/1971 
Post-election tensions between East and West 
Pakistan erupt into massive resistance by 
Bengali nationalists; intervention by India 
leads to establishment of independent 
Bangladesh (ETH 3/71-11/71). Military 
imposes martial law and uses tanks, airpower, 
and artillery to indiscriminately attack civilians 
(GEN 3/71-12/71). Deepening political divide 
between East and West Pakistan results in the 
dissolution of the Pakistani union (REG 7/71-
12/71). 
Complex 02/1973 - 
07/1977 
Baluchi rebellion against central authority, 
backed by opposition National Awami Party 
(ETH 2/73-7/77) is sup pressed by military 
using indiscriminate violence against civilians 
(GEN 2/73-7/77). Surprise parliamentary 
elections called by democratic government in 
1977, lead to escalating political violence. 
General Zia leads military coup, dissolves 
legislature, arrests politicians and declares 
martial law (REG 7/77).  
Complex 08/1983 - Violent campaign by Sindhis seeking 
autonomy; violent attacks on Muhajirs in 
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Continuing Karachi (ETH 8/83-11/98). General Musharraf 
leads military coup on 10/12/99, arrests 
democratically-elected Prime Minister Sharif, 
suspends constitution, dissolves Parliament, 
and imposes rule by National Security Council 
(REG 10/99). Ethnic-Pashtuns in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) along the 
border with Afghanistan provide safe harbor 
for co-ethnic Taliban fighters and allied al 
Qaeda fighters. Government offensives against 
militants in March 2004 are met with local 
resistance, mainly in South and North 
Waziristan (ETH from 3/04)  
 
Table 2 shows that Pakistan has had a number of significant events that have 
led to its political instability. Some of these events are still ongoing and they are 
largely classified as Ethnic Wars. 
3.2 INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT FOR RESEARCH 
There are many infrastructure projects currently ongoing in Pakistan. To 
choose the appropriate infrastructure project, we must consider the economic state of 
Pakistan’s physical infrastructure. Three main areas identified by Shaukat Tarin et al. 
(2009) are transport, communication and energy.  
The transportation network of any country is of vital importance to its 
development and affects all sectors through economic linkages. It ensures safe and 
timely travelling, encourages business activities and cuts down transportation costs 
while granting access to producers for marketing their goods. Pakistan’s economic 
development partly depends on improvement/modernisation of its transport sector 
accounting for 11 percent of GDP and 16 percent of fixed investment (Tarin et al. 
2009). 
With regards to the communication industry, Pakistan has a teledensity of 
62.4%, with the cellular industry having a 94 percent share, followed by fixed local 
loop with 3.5 percent and wireless local loop with 2.5 percent. The total cellular 
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subscribers by February 2010 reached 96.2 million with a positive growth rate of 2 
percent (Shaikh et al. 2010).  
Finally, the energy sector of Pakistan faced a number of issues and hindered 
developments continued to severely constrain Pakistan’s economy during the 
financial year of 2009-2010 (Shaikh et al. 2010). Against a backdrop of a sharp 
increase in the international price of oil through 2009, an enormous upward pressure 
was seen on the power generation (and transport) sector, resulting in large domestic 
supply shortages of electricity and gas. Lower accumulation of water reserves in 
dams compounded the severity. The cumulative effect of the energy crises on the 
economy was estimated at upward of 2 percent of GDP during 2009-2010 alone 
(Shaikh et al. 2010).  
This shows that the infrastructure projects that are specifically aimed at the 
energy sector would form a good basis for this research, as they would not only have 
seen a heavy influence from investors, but a large political influence from within 
Pakistan as well. 
During 2008-2009, Pakistan’s final energy consumption of about 37.3 million 
tonnes of oil equivalent were met by mix of gas, oil, electricity, coal and LPG 
sources with varying shares. The National Electric Power Regulatory Authority 
(NEPRA) is exclusively responsible for regulating the provision of electric power 
services. During the period July-March 2009-2010, NEPRA processed 10 
applications for the grant of generation licenses, including thermal and hydro-electric 
power plants with a cumulative capacity of 311.4MW. 
The installed capacity of the Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO) 
system was 18,233 MW as of March 2010 with hydro-electric generation accounting 
for 6,555 MW and thermal generation producing 11,678 MW. The hydro-electric 
power capacity accounted for 35.95 percent of production while 64.05 percent was 
accounted by thermal generation (Shaikh et al. 2010). 
The consumption of electricity by economic group identifies the domestic 
sector as the largest user of electricity in Pakistan. Out of the following economic 
groups; domestic, commercial, industrial, agriculture, public-lighting, bulk supply, 
traction and the supply to the Karachi Electric Supply Company Limited (KESC), the 
domestic sector consumed 42.15 percent of generated electricity in 2009-2010. 
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Finally, we can see that transmission and distribution losses as percent of net 
system energy has remained more or less stagnant between 21 percent to 25 percent 
from 2000 to 2009 (Shaikh et al. 2010). 
Taking into consideration the above facts and figures, a major energy 
infrastructure project would form a firm basis for this research – where investor 
interest would be high as well as political influence from the Pakistan Government 
and its domestic sector would be evident. Of the current major energy infrastructure 
projects, the Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP) is also located in a 
politically disputed geographic location – forming a good candidate for this research. 
This project is further explained in the section below. 
3.2.1 Neelum-Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP) 
Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP) is a run of the river hydroelectric 
generation project that is located in the vicinity of Muzaffarabad in the territory of 
Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K). This large infrastructure project diverts the 
Neelum river water through a tunnel, into a power house and out falling into Jhelum 
River. 
 
Figure 9: The Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project in reference with the Kishanganga Project 
 
The NJHP was initially identified by the Hydro Electric Planning Organization 
(HEPO) of the Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) at a cost of 
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USD$167 million in 1989. A redesign of the project in 2005 raised the cost to 
USD$935 million. The Pakistani government awarded the contract for construction 
to a Chinese consortium in 2007, and estimated the cost of the project to be USD$ 
2.16 Billion as of 2009. 
The project has experienced significant delays, funding issues and political 
disputes with regards to the Indus River Treaty signed between India and Pakistan.  
This large infrastructure project has been carefully chosen with specific 
reference to (Flyvberg 2006), who says that a carefully chosen experiment, case 
and/or experience can lead to the critical case, where one case may be able to provide 
sufficient evidence to justify an argument. Further details on research design can be 
found in Section 3.4 and details on the Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project can be 
found in Section 4.2 below. 
3.2.2 Pakistan – India Water Rights Treaty 
The Indus Water Treaty (IWT) is a trilateral agreement between Pakistan, India 
and the World Bank, basically agreeing to the splitting of the Indus Rivers, awarding 
rights over the Eastern Rivers (Ravi, Sutlej, Beas) to India and the majority of the 
flow of the Western Rivers (Indus, Chenab, Jhelum) to Pakistan. India, however is 
accorded customary usage of water in the Western Rivers for agricultural purposes 
and run-of-the-river electricity generation projects (Nehru and Khan 1960). 
The average annual flows of the eastern and westerns rivers in the Indus 
system are shown in Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10: Average annual flow of the rivers of the Indus River Systems (Bakshi and Trivedi 2011) 
Referring to Figure 11, the Indus River originates from a spring near the 
Mansarowar Lake, on the Northern side of the Himalayan Range in Kailas Parbat, 
Tibet, it is then joined by its five major tributaries (Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, 
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Sutlej), the Kabul River and several other small rivers as well. Pakistan’s Tarbela 
dam is situated on the Indus River along with several other barrages – Chasma, 
Kotri, Sukkur being a few of the important ones. 
The Jhelum River arises from springs on the north western side of Pir Panjal 
that separates Jammu and Kashmir. It gets its water from various important sources 
including glaciers located in the north of the Kashmir valley. The River runs through 
the Dal and Wullar Lakes in Jammu & Kashmir and therefore, feeds the supply of 
water to these lakes. The Jhelum is joined by its tributary the Kishanganga (known as 
Neelam in Pakistan) at Domail in Muzaffarabad in the Province of Kashmir. 
The Chenab River arises in Himachal Pradesh in India and is formed by its two 
major tributaries the Chandra and the Bhaga. A large part of its catchment area is 
located in Jammu (part of J&K). It enters Pakistani territory upstream at the Marala 
Barrage. The total length of the Chenab is approximately 960km. 
 
Figure 11: The Indus Rivers 
 34 Chapter 3: Research Design 
3.2.3  Driving Factors for Rising Water Demand in Pakistan 
The main factors driving water demand in Pakistan are agriculture, hydro-
electricity and storage capacity. Water is essential for power generation and 29 – 32 
percent of total power in Pakistan is generated through hydropower. According to the 
Managing Director of Pakistan Electric Power Company (PEPCO), Munawar B. 
Ahmed, Pakistan faced an electricity deficit of 3,500 MW in 2009. It currently has a 
hydro-electric generation capacity of 6,555MW - generated by its 3 large 
hydropower dams (Tarbela 11.96km
3
, a raised Mangla 10.15km
3
 and Chasma 
0.87km
3
) - but its total hydro-electric potential is estimated at 40,000MW. Pakistan is 
pushing to increase its total installed hydropower capacity to an ambitious 
20,000MW by 2017 and 27,000MW by 2025 as specified in the Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA)’s ‘Vision’ documents. Consequently, WAPDA 
has recently embarked on a series of new hydropower projects in the Province of 
Kashmir, many of them in collaboration with Chinese contractors – among these are 
the 969 MW Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP) and the 4,500MW 
Diamer Bhasha project. It should be noted that out of the 40,000MW hydropower 
potential, 15,000MW (38%) are in the Northern Areas alone. 
3.3 METHODOLOGY AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
3.3.1 Methodology 
The chosen solution for methodology is case studies. There is much that can be 
said about case studies in this section however the focus will be on the following 
topics: Methods for performing case studies, the validity of case studies when 
studying only one case and generalising for a broader class (Yin 2003) and the lack 
of context-independent theory in social science - a broader class of political science 
(Flyvberg 2006).  
The case study methodology is based on an in-depth investigation of a single 
individual, group, or event to explore causation in order to find underlying principles, 
as defined in (Shepard and Greene 2003). 
According to Robert Yin (2003) there are what seems, simply, four stages 
when performing a case study: designing a case study, preparing for data collection, 
collecting the evidence and finally analysing the evidence. For this stage of the 
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research, a greater understanding of the method involved in the evidence collection 
will indicate whether a case study method is a good research solution approach. 
Data for case studies can come from many sources of evidence, and six 
important ones are mentioned in (Yin 2003). These are listed as: 
1. Documentation 
2. Archival Records 
3. Interviews 
4. Direct Observation 
5. Participant Observation 
6. Physical Artefacts 
These sources will provide the evidence required to complete a case study. 
However, choosing which sources to utilise and base analysis on; will depend on the 
strengths and weaknesses of the sources as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Strengths and weaknesses of different sources of evidence for case studies (Yin 2003) 
Source of 
Evidence 
Strength Weakness 
Documentation 
Stable – Can be reviewed 
repeatedly 
Unobtrusive – Not created as a 
result of the case study 
Exact – Contains exact names, 
references and details of an 
event 
Broad coverage – long span of 
time, many events, and many 
settings 
Irretrievability can be high 
Biased selectivity – if 
collection is incomplete 
Reporting bias – reflects 
unknown bias of the author 
Access – may be deliberately 
blocked 
Archival Records 
Same as documentation 
Precise and Quantitative 
Same as documentation 
Accessibility due to privacy 
reasons 
Interviews 
Targeted – Focuses directly on 
case study topic 
Insightful – provides perceived 
casual inferences 
Bias due to poorly constructed 
questions 
Response bias 
Inaccuracies due to poor recall 
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Reflexivity – interviewee gives 
what interviewer wants to hear 
Direct 
Observations 
Reality – covers events in real 
time 
Contextual – covers context of 
event 
Time consuming 
Selectivity – unless broad 
coverage 
Reflexivity – event may occur 
differently as it is being 
observed 
Cost – hours needed by human 
observers 
Participant 
Observations 
Same as direct observations 
Insightful into interpersonal 
behaviour and motives 
Same as direct observations 
Bias due to investigators 
manipulation of events 
Physical 
Artefacts 
Insightful into cultural features 
Insightful into technical 
operations 
Selectivity 
availability 
 
Each method of evidence collection has its own strengths and weaknesses. 
Here, documentation and archival records present the most strength, as long as there 
is clear availability. 
Large infrastructure projects involve several parties, resulting in an emphasis 
on accurate and descriptive documentation. Records of designs, work completed, and 
problems occurred are documented and archived throughout the lifetime of the 
project. This is an advantageous feature of large infrastructure projects for 
performing a case study. 
3.4 RESEARCH DESIGN 
The method in which case studies of large infrastructure projects can be done, 
will be to first, associate with at least one, if not several external organisations in 
order to collect existing and previous project data. As the point of view of a 
successful project varies, as described in (Saqib, Farooqui and Lodi 2008) both the 
client and consultant points of view will need to be considered. 
A detailed investigation would then need to follow, through the collection and 
analysis of evidence, for all delays and project set-backs during the infrastructure 
project lifetime. Here, any record of governmental, social and political changes that 
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directly or indirectly affected the projects performance would need to be identified 
and catalogued. This catalogue would then serve as the solution for identifying if 
political risks were a major contributor to any project management risks. 
The result would be the objective determination of the risks faced in 
infrastructure projects in politically unstable countries and an answer to the research 
problem statement. 
The point of concern is the limited time-frame in which the detailed 
investigation must be completed; and hence, the unlikelihood of there being more 
than one case study. If that is the case, then as stated by Abercrombie et al. (1984): 
“a case study cannot provide reliable information about the broader class, but it may 
be useful in the preliminary stages of an investigation since it provides hypotheses, 
which may be tested systematically with a larger number of cases”. This is however, 
strongly counter-argued by Bent Flyvberg (2006). Flyvberg suggests that, a carefully 
chosen experiment, case and/or experience can lead to the critical case, where one 
case may be able to provide sufficient evidence to justify an argument. A clear case 
was Galileo’s rejection of Aristotle’s theory on gravity, through a singular ‘critical’ 
case study of a feather and a piece of lead falling to the ground at the same time 
without the effects of the atmosphere. This was also proven by a singular experiment 
about 50 years later. Robert Yin (2003) and Robert Stake (1995) also support this 
ideology. 
The last topic for concern with performing a case study is the lack of predictive 
theory, in relation to the topic of political science, when investigating its effect on 
large infrastructure projects. Bent Flyvberg (2006) addresses this issue by concluding 
in his work, that “social science has not succeeded in producing general, context-
independent theory, and thus, has in the final instance nothing else to offer except 
concrete context-dependent knowledge”. He later concludes that “predictive theories 
and universals cannot be found in the study of human affairs. Concrete, context-
dependent knowledge is, therefore, more valuable than the vain search for predictive 
theories and universals.” This is an interesting stance on the topic of social science 
and one that can be used to evaluate the context-dependant views on political affairs 
that may affect a large infrastructure project. 
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3.5 PARTICIPANTS 
The Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP) has a consultancy group of 
five different organisations. Observations and review of documentation will be done 
from one of the major consultancies in this group, namely the National Engineering 
and Services Pakistan (NESPAK) consultancy. 
Figure 12 shows the head office of the NESPAK consultancy in Lahore, 
Pakistan and where the majority of the documents for the Neelum Jhelum 
Hydroelectric Project will obtained and reviewed. A site visit to Muzaffarabad will 
also be conducted to meet with contractors, consultants from the other consultants 
working on this project and site engineers and team leaders from the client.  
 
Figure 12: The NESPAK consultancy head office in Lahore, Pakistan 
3.6 PROCEDURE AND TIMELINE 
The procedure for collecting the data involved the different consultancies part 
of the Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP), at both the head offices, the 
design houses and the site location of the project. 
The data collection will be spread over several months and a site visit 
completed in September of 2010. The visit will be conducted under supervision from 
NESPAK. Table 4 shows a timeline of the work done for this research. 
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Table 4: Timeline for Research design and methodology 
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3.7 ANALYSIS 
Data analysis is the final and most important exercise of the proposed research. 
This section attempts to investigate different data analysis methods, in order to 
provide a measure of the political influence that a large infrastructure project may 
encounter in its lifetime. 
3.7.1 Predictive Analytics 
Predictive analytics encompasses a variety of techniques from statistics, data 
mining and game theory that analyse current and historical facts to make predictions 
about future events. Statistical techniques utilised in predictive analytics form a 
number of analysis solutions for the research problem. In practical situations, the 
analyst will have to derive (stochastic) models of the system at hand, or at least have 
to choose from several possible models in order to perform analysis. To be 
“realistic”, a model must describe the essential features of the system, but may not 
have to be exact in all details (Rausand and Høyland 2004). Some of these statistical 
modelling and analysis techniques are presented below. 
3.7.2 Regression 
According to David Freedman (2005) regression models are the mainstay of 
predictive analytics. The focus lies on establishing a mathematical equation as a 
model to represent the interactions between the different variables in consideration. 
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Depending on the situation, there is a wide variety of models that can be applied 
while performing predictive analytics. Some of these are listed below: 
1. Linear regression model 
2. Logistic regression 
3. Multinomial Logistic Regression 
4. Probit Regression 
3.7.3 Time Series Modelling 
Time series models are used for predicting or forecasting the future behaviour 
of variables. These models account for the fact that data points taken over time may 
have an internal structure (such as autocorrelation, trend or seasonal variation) that 
should be accounted for. Time series models estimate difference equations 
containing stochastic components. Two commonly used forms of these models are 
autoregressive models (AR) and moving average (MA) models (Gershenfeld 1999). 
3.7.4 Survival Analysis 
More commonly known as ‘reliability analysis’, survival analysis is involved 
with modelling time to event data; in this context, death or failure is considered an 
‘event’ in survival analysis literature. The overall structure of the system is illustrated 
by a functional block diagram. A classification system for the various functions of a 
functional block and illustration of functions by various types of function diagrams is 
then presented. Failures, failure modes, and failure effects are defined and discussed 
and various failure classification functions are presented. Finally a number of 
methods for reliability analysis are presented (Rausand and Høyland 2004): 
1. Failure Modes, Effects and Criticality Analysis (FMEA/FMECA) 
2. Fault Tree Analysis 
3. Cause and Effect Diagrams 
4. Bayesian Belief Networks 
5. Event Tree Analysis 
6. Reliability Block Diagrams 
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Figure 13 - A technical system and its interfaces as shown in (Rausand and Høyland 2004) 
A technical system is then presented as shown in the above figure and the 
analysis is performed in one of the above mentioned methods. 
3.7.5 Radial Basis Functions 
Radial basis functions are a machine learning technique that is a real valued 
function so that its value depends only on the distance from origin. (Buhmann 2003) 
explains that radial basis functions are well suited for approximating functions that: 
1. Depend on many variables or parameters 
2. Are defined by possibly very many data 
3. And the data are scattered in their domain 
Radial basis functions are typically used to build up function approximations of 
the form (Buhmann 2003): 
𝑠(𝑥) = ∑ 𝜆𝜉𝜙(‖. −𝜉‖),               𝑥 ∈ ℝ
𝑛
𝜉∈Ξ
 
With real coefficients 𝜆𝜉 . 
3.7.6 Naïve Bayes 
 
Naïve Bayes is a simple probabilistic classifier based on applying Bayes 
theorem with strong independence (Naïve) assumptions. Essentially, this means that 
the underlying probability model has a very high number of predictors; its an 
independent feature model. As shown in (Zhang 2004), the classifier can be easily 
derived as below. 
The probability of an example 𝐸 = (𝑥1, 𝑥2, … . 𝑥𝑛) being class 𝑐 is: 
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𝑝(𝑐|𝐸) =
𝑝(𝐸|𝑐)𝑝(𝑐)
𝑝(𝐸)
 
𝐸is classified as the class 𝐶 = + if and only if 
𝑓𝑏(𝐸) =
𝑝(𝐶 = +|𝐸)
𝑝(𝐶 = −|𝐸)
 ≥ 1 
 
Where 𝑓𝑏(𝐸) is called a Bayesian Classifier. 
Now, assuming that all the attributes are independent – our naïve bayes 
classifier assumption – given the value of the class variable; that is: 
𝑝(𝐸|𝑐) = 𝑝(𝑥1, 𝑥2, … . 𝑥𝑛|𝑐) = ∏ 𝑝(𝑥𝑖, 𝑐),
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Then the resulting classifier 𝑓𝑛𝑏(𝐸) is the naïve bayes classifier. 
𝑓𝑛𝑏(𝐸) =
𝑝(𝐶 = +|𝐸)
𝑝(𝐶 = −|𝐸)
∏
𝑝(𝑥𝑖|𝐶 = +)
𝑝(𝑥𝑖|𝐶 = −)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
This type of classifier is extremely useful in the context of this research as each 
attribute in the classifier has no parent, except its class. Each attribute is independent 
and hence, more suitable to modelling the risk factors of a large infrastructure project 
– that are likely to be independent of one another apart from class. 
3.8 CHOSEN ANALYSIS METHOD 
Earlier literature review identified that system dynamics modelling could 
possibly be used to determine political risks and identify managerial actions and their 
effects. However, due to the difficult nature of the chosen project and the 
environment in which it will be conducted, a decision was made to only consider 
statistical methods for analysis. 
The statistical methods with which a measure of the political influence on a 
large infrastructure project will be identified, has also been reviewed earlier during 
the literature review. The major benefit of using Naïve Bayes classifiers was 
identified as the ability to allow for a range of independent risk factors, model the 
probability of events and predict the ‘gravity’ of the risk factor occurring on the 
overall project, as proven in (Palomo, Insua and Ruggeri 2007). This method is 
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readily available and published, and hence chosen for the analysis component of this 
research. 
3.9 ETHICS AND LIMITATIONS 
The research did not involve, animals or genetically modified organisms and 
therefore did not require any special clearances with regards to research ethics - 
exempt from any ethical clearance as in (SLSRC 2010) and (UAEC 2010).  
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Chapter 4: Results 
This chapter discusses in detail the results obtained from the research 
conducted on the Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP). 
4.1 AZAD JAMMU AND KASHMIR 
Azad Jammu and Kashmir, abbreviated AJK or, for short, Azad 
Kashmir (literally "Free Kashmir") is the southernmost and the smaller of two 
political entities which together constitute the Pakistani-controlled part of the former 
princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, as shown in Figure 14, which ceased to exist 
as a result of the first Kashmir war in 1947.  
 
Figure 14: Map of Pakistan showing the area governed as Azad Jammu and Kashmir 
Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJK) is a self-governing state under Pakistani 
control, but under Pakistan's constitution the state is not actually part of Pakistan. 
Azad Kashmir has its own elected President, Prime Minister, Legislative Assembly, 
and High Court. 
The northern part of Azad Jammu and Kashmir encompasses the lower part of 
the Himalayas. Fertile, green, mountainous valleys are characteristic of Azad 
Kashmir's geography, as highlighted by Figure 15 and Figure 16 below. 
 46 Chapter 4: Results 
The southern parts of Azad Kashmir including Bhimber, Mirpur and Kotli 
districts have extremely hot weather in summers and moderate cold weather in 
winters, receiving most of their rain during monsoon season. Snow fall occurs during 
December and January. Muzaffarabad and Pattan are among the wettest areas of the 
state. Throughout most of the region, the average rainfall exceeds 1400 mm, with the 
highest average rainfall occurring near Muzaffarabad (around 1800 mm). During the 
summer season, monsoon floods of the Jhelum and Leepa rivers are common, due to 
high rainfall and melting snow. 
 
 
Figure 15: A picture of the Capital city of Azad Jammu and Kashmir: Muzaffarabad 
 
Figure 16: The Neelum River winding its way through the fertile green mountain valleys of Azad 
Jammu Kashmir 
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4.1.1 Races, Ethnic Tribes and Languages 
Azad Jammu and Kashmir is a land of fascinating people, languages & culture. 
The population is composed of different races claiming their descent from Semitic, 
Mongoloid, Aryans, Persians, Turks and Arabs. The races are all outsiders who came 
in to the AJK and settled at various stages of history. The population is composed of 
a diverse range of eight major ethnic groups or castes which include; Abbasi, Rajput, 
Awan, Gujjar, Mir, Jat, Mughal and Sudhan. The groups are reasonably well 
distributed throughout AJK with the Abbasis being numerically dominant. The 
distribution of ethnic castes at the different project sites is shown in the tables below. 
Table 5: Ethnic structure of locals at Project Site C1 in 2009 
 
Table 6: Ethnic structure of locals at Project Site C2 in 2009 
 
Table 7: Ethnic structure of locals at Project Site C3 in 2009 
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4.1.2 Administrative Set-up 
The state of Azad Jammu and Kashmir has a parliamentary form of 
government. The President is the head of state, while the Prime Minister, supported 
by the Council of Ministers is the Chief Executive. The Chairman and Councillors 
are elected by the villagers. The Chairman of the Union Council has judiciary 
powers. Together with other councillors the Chairman can determine mild offences 
such as settling family disputes and cases of theft. 
AJK covers an area of 13,297km
2
 and for administrative purposes is divided 
into districts, subdivisions or Tehsils, Qanungo circles, Patwar or revenue circles and 
census villages or mauzas. Villages used for census purposes are aggregations of 
dispersed hamlets, which are often organised by proximity to water, cultivable land 
or family affinity. The following is the list of the 8 districts if AJK: 
1. Neelum 
2. Muzaffarabad 
3. Bagh 
4. Sudhnuti 
5. Poonch 
6. Kotli 
7. Mirpur 
8. Bhimber 
 
Figure 17: The 8 districts of AJK 
  
In 1996, NJHP was supposed to be located in four villages, however, within the 
present project layout, the project affects sixteen villages located in Panjkot, 
Langarpura and Chatter Kalas Patwar Circles. 
The head pond and intake area is within the Union Council of Panjkot which 
consists of 10 villages with an estimated population of 11,852 persons as of 2008. 
The Panjkot Union Council includes the village of Nauseri which is situated at the 
intake. The Jhelum river crossing at Majhoi is within the Union Council of Chatter 
Domel. The estimated population for Majhoi village is 1106 persons as of 2008. 
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Finally, the power house outlet is located within the Union Council of Chatter Kalas. 
The mauza estimated population for Chatter Kalas village is 976 persons as of 2008. 
This information is summarised in Table 8 below. 
Table 8: Administrative areas of the NJHP project sites 
 
4.2 DETAILED STUDY OF NJHP 
The following sections provide detailed information on the Neelum Jhelum 
Hydroelectric Project that was obtained during the research period. Further detailed 
information can be found in the Appendices. 
4.2.1 Description of Project 
The Pakistan Water & Power Development Authority (WAPDA) completed the 
bidding phase for the construction of a hydroelectric project, signing a construction 
contract with a consortium of the China Gezhouba Group Corporation (CGGC) and 
China Machinery Engineering Corporation (CMEC) on 19 December 2007 in an 
amount of Rs. 90, 900,240,404 and a construction period of 93 months. The contract 
commenced on 30 January 2008 with a completion date of 30 October 2015. 
The Client then appointed Neelum-Jhelum Consultants on 15 May 2008. The 
consultant was appointed to review the design, prepare and develop construction 
drawings for the project and supervise the works. The consultant started with 
preliminary support work from early June 2008 but the agreement was activated on 1 
August 2008. 
The Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP) is a run of the river 
hydroelectric power generation project in the northern area of Pakistan, in the 
vicinity of Muzaffarabad – the capital city of Azad Jammu Kashmir. The Neelum 
Jhelum Hydroelectric Project has an installed capacity of 963 MW and will produce 
5.15 Billion units of electricity annually. 
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4.2.2 Project Location  
Water is diverted at Nauseri, 41km East of Muzaffarabad from the Neelum 
River into a 28.5km long headrace tunnel through a mountain range. A power station 
will be constructed at the end of the headrace tunnel at Chatter Kalas, 22km South of 
Muzaffarabad, underground. After passing through the power station, the water will 
be released into Jhelum River about 4km South of Chatter Kalas, through a 3.5km 
tailrace tunnel. 
Figure 18 and Figure 19 below show the major project site locations, C1, C2 
and C3 and the length of the tunnels to be constructed.  
 
Figure 18: Map of Azad Jammu and Kashmir highlighting the NJHP sites and tunnel on a terrain map 
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Figure 19: Location of the project sites C1, C2 and C3 on a geographic map of Pakistan's northern 
area 
4.2.2.1 Nauseri Dam 
The concrete dam, 135 m long, will be located at Nauseri on Neelum River. 
The river bed is at Elevation 971 m above sea level. The elevation of the dam crest 
will be at 1012.6 m above sea level. The dam height will be 41.6 m above the river 
bed. The dam’s foundation will be 67.9 m wide and will be laid at Elevation 968 m 
on rock after excavation. The dam will have 4 bays. Each bay will have a control 
gate to hold back the flow. The bay floor has been protected from erosion by ‘Block 
out Concrete’. The radial gates are sized at 12 m (W) x 8 m (H) and can discharge 
7000 m
2
/s. The dam also provides an upper gate to release floatable debris. A road 
deck has been provided on the dam at Elevation 1015 m which is 2.4 m above the 
crest of the dam. The consultant intends to review and revise the layout on approval 
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from the client. Figure 20 shows some construction work that has already begun on 
the Nauseri Dam. This area is referred to as Site C1. 
 
Figure 20: A satellite image of the area where the Nauseri Dam will be constructed.                         
This is referred to as Site C1. 
4.2.2.2 Main Power Tunnel 
The main power tunnel from Nauseri to the power house site is 28.556 km 
long. This is made up of 13.165 km of tunnel from Nauseri toward Jhelum as twin 
tunnel each of 52 m2 cross section area (twin tunnel is due to dictates of geological 
formation of rocks). The balance 12.869 km will be a single tunnel of larger area of 
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cross-section (100 m2). The tunnels are shotcrete lined. Full lining will be done under 
exceptional circumstances. The first 13.165 km of the tunnel are on a mild slope of 
1:500. 
The tunnel crosses under Jhelum River at El 400 m which is approximately 
380m below the Jhelum River bed at Thotha. This depth is required because of the 
rock mechanics requirements for unlined pressure tunnel. The tunnel rises again on 
steep slope and then returns to mild slope of 1:500. The Consultants are studying to 
eliminate this kink.  
Figure 21 and Figure 22 show the entrance works at what is called Site C2 and 
a cross section of the main power tunnel respectively.  
 
Figure 21: A satellite image of the area where the major tunnel entrance is being constructed.           
This is referred to as Site C2. 
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Figure 22: A cross section of the Main Power Tunnel 
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4.2.2.3 Power House 
The power station facility is underground.  
 
Figure 23: A satellite image of the area where the entrance to the power house is being constructed, 
also know as Site C3. 
 
The underground cavern is 131m long, 21.2 m wide and about 40 m high from 
the turbine floor. The power station has 4 units with a total maximum capacity of 
about 963 MW. Twelve single phase transformers units will be installed, each 98.33 
MVA. The transformers will be placed in separate hall which shall be 125m long, 
16.4 m wide and 15.5 m high. The main access tunnel to the power house is 785 m 
long and has a cross-section of 58m
2
. The cable tunnel will be 600 m long, having 
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cross-section area 51 m2.This tunnel serves as access to the transformer hall and 
routing of high voltage cables to the switchyard. The outdoor switchyard will be 
located at Agar Nullah just outside the cable tunnel portal. The outdoor switchyard is 
131 m x 262 m. 
 
Figure 24: Model of the Power Station Complex 
4.2.3 The Client 
The Pakistan Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) is the 
implementation agency for the Project on behalf of the government of Pakistan. The 
WAPDA’s central office is located in Lahore at the magnificent WAPDA house, as 
shown in Figure 25 below. 
 
Figure 25: WAPDA House in Lahore 
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WAPDA was created in 1958 as a semi-autonomous body for the purpose of 
coordinating and giving a unified direction to the development of schemes in the 
water and power sectors in Pakistan, which were previously being dealt with, by the 
respective electricity and irrigation department of individual provinces. The power 
production and distribution was held under WAPDA. 
The Charter of Duties of WAPDA (since 2007) is to investigate, plan and 
execute schemes for the following fields: 
a. Generation, Transmission and Distribution of Power. 
b. Irrigation, Water Supply and Drainage. 
c. Prevention of and Reclamation of Waterlogged and Saline Lands. 
d. Flood Management. 
e. Inland Navigation. 
The Authority comprises of a chairman and three members working through a 
Secretary. WAPDA is one of the largest employers of human resources in Pakistan. 
Over the years WAPDA has built-up a reservoir of Technical know-how and 
expertise which has made it a modern and progressive organisation. 
To implement Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project WAPDA has created the 
Neelum Jhelum Hydro Power Company (NJHC), with its office at Sunny View 
Estate, Empress Road, Lahore. This organisation is headed by the Chief Executive 
Officer. The NJHC has established the office of Project Director at Muzaffarabad for 
management and supervision of the Project. 
4.2.4 The Contractor 
The NJHPC awarded the construction contract of this project to M/s CGGC-
CMEC Consortium of China on July 7, 2007. The Contractor has its office at 12 
Jinnah Lane, Sarfraz Rafiqui Road, Lahore Cantt (true as on 30th June 2009). The 
Contractor has set up its field offices at Nauseri (C-1), Thotha (C-2) and Chatter 
Kalas (C-3) in AJK. 
4.2.5 The Consultants 
The NJHC has employed Neelum Jhelum Consultants (NJC) (a consortium of 
five consultants- Joint venture) for supervision services with effect from 15th May 
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2008.The consortium is made up of MWH, NORPLAN, NESPAK, ACE and NDC. 
MWH leads the consortium. The consultant’s office is located at 158 Garden Block, 
New garden Town Lahore. A site office is located at Muzaffarabad. The Chief 
Resident Engineers at Nauseri (C-1), Thotha (C-2) and Chatter Kalas (C-3) provide 
overall supervision for dam, tunnel and powerhouse construction. They are supported 
by a team of experts 
4.3 UNINTERPRETED PROJECT VISIT ACCOUNTS 
The collection of data for the intended research involved project site visits. 
Data was collected from a wide variety of sources including; observations (both 
direct and participant) and review of documentation, such as progress reports and 
project timelines. Due to the nature of the project, it was asked not to reveal names 
and specifics – hence the results below are presented in a manner as interpreted by 
the author. 
 This section contains the uninterpreted project accounts during these project 
site visits. Pictures are provided for support where possible. 
ACCOUNT 1: “the project was influenced by a huge amount of political 
pressure because of several reasons. The first being, that Pakistan had a higher 
demand for electricity than it was able to produce – with the majority of users being 
domestic (42% as per the 2009-2010 economic report of Pakistan). The second 
reason was to ensure that Pakistan secured the rights to the water as per the Indus 
Water Treaty, not allowing India to build large projects upstream. This political 
pressure caused the design stage of the project to be overlooked in large, land 
acquisition to be mostly incomplete and inadequate infrastructure built (such as 
power and staging facilities) before the project was tendered.” 
ACCOUNT 2: “Due to the lack of adequate facilities in the remote area that 
this project is situated in, very few ex-patriot experts are willing to travel and live 
here. Those that are, demand very high salaries, special insurance policies and extra 
protection. There are approximately 200 policemen for this project for the total of 
232 consultant staff that are at the project sites and design offices. Each foreigner 
travels with a gunman guard for any sort of travelling on this project. There have 
still been attempted kidnappings of foreigners on other projects in the area. This 
protocol creates a large time delay for any project work.” (Refer to  
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Figure 26: Difficult living conditions near Adit tunnel A2 
ACCOUNT 3: “In January 2010, three terrorists attempted suicide outside of 
the Muzaffarabad office. Two of the terrorists were successful and one was killed by 
police. No project personnel were harmed. A similar event occurred at a mosque, 
only 4km away from the Muzaffarabad office, when a terrorist committed suicide.” 
 
Figure 27: Muzaffarabad Supreme court adjacent the NJHP main site office 
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ACCOUNT 4: “The Chinese contractor management has a cultural conflict 
with the client and consultants. The contractor does not take advice from the client 
and the consultants seriously. The contractor also bribes local authorities, site 
engineers and workers to get work done. This encourages a corrupt culture and 
undermines the authority of the client.” 
ACCOUNT 5: “It is estimated that 10% of the delay to the project is due to 
incapable workers, inefficiency of project teams and corruption. This is a rough 
estimate provided by the MWH and Norplan consultants.” 
ACCOUNT 6: “During the project, there was an unscheduled change of the 
Prime Minister of Azad Jammu Kashmir. This change initiated a change to the 
facilitators of the NJHP, who were selected by political reference and not technical 
capability or experience. These people have been unhelpful and added project cost 
and delay.” 
ACCOUNT 7: “The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) paid 
the local government of Azad Jammu Kashmir in full for the acquisition of all land 
required for the project. This duty was the responsibility of the deputy commissioner, 
who appointed the commissioner relief to disperse compensation to the affected 
locals. According to the Environment Impact Assessment conducted at the start of 
this project, the majority of families lived in a family system and hence there was a 
single house for large families. The compensation was only per household. Once 
locals found out that the project was a multi-billion dollar project, they built new 
homes for each of their children and demanded compensation. The AJK government 
knew about this and did not pay all the locals, resulting in several locals starting 
court cases against the project. These locals could not be forcefully removed and 
hence created delays to the project, until they were compensated fully.” 
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Figure 28: Section of land not acquired, but needed to complete the Access road near Adit tunnel A1 
 
Figure 29: Limited access to the Desander area due to land not being provided properly 
 
Figure 30: Existing house at the entrance of Adit Tunnel A4. The owner did not move out till the first 
blast.  
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ACCOUNT 8: “The local government also had the responsibility of evaluating 
the environment effects and developing mitigation procedures. They also had to 
convince residents and locals of the merits of the project. The local government was 
also responsible for the maintenance and development of local roads and bridges. 
They received payment for this work from the National Highway Authority (NHA) 
which was the regulatory authority” 
 
Figure 31: Broken roads en-route to Site C3 creating a dangerous situation for heavy project vehicles 
 
Figure 32: Progress to build required bridges extremely slow by NJHP. The left picture is dated 
August 2009 and the right picture is dated December 2009. 
ACCOUNT 9: “Consumable items such as petrol, calling cards, mobile 
phones and food had been stolen on several occasions by workers. Resources such as 
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official vehicles and official residences were also used for personal reasons. WAPDA 
officials knew about this.” 
ACCOUNT 10: “As part of the contract, the contractor is required to ensure 
that local labour is hired in order to increase the number of jobs available for local 
residents. However, the contractor has been hiring an average ration of 1:1.5 of 
Chinese versus local labour as per a Neelum Jhelum Consultant’s quarterly report. 
It was also reported that the Chinese contractor has been bringing both skilled and 
unskilled workers from China. The report also mentioned that the Chinese contractor 
has been paying different rates to the local labour and the Chinese labour, with the 
rates being in favour of the Chinese labour. Contract agreements in this regard, have 
not been adequately audited by the client.” 
 
Figure 33: Personnel attending the turbine model test. Majority of workers are from China. 
ACCOUNT 11: “The funding for Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project is 
collected from a range of sources, including the Islamic Development Bank, the 
Kuwait Fund, the Abu Dhabi Fund, the Asian Development Bank and by taxes and 
tariffs collected from the people of Pakistan through their electricity bills. The large 
amount of funding collected from these sources is subject to spending by the 
government. A change of government could possibly stop the funding all together or 
as in some cases earlier, the Pakistani Rupees are converted to US Dollars to enable 
prevent large sums from the effects of inflation.” 
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ACCOUNT 12: “Initial studies for the NJHP actually started in 1997, however 
due to various changes, the design was only finalised between the years 2008 and 
2010.” 
ACCOUNT 13: “When the contractor brought tunnelling equipment to 
Pakistan, he assumed that stable and continuous power supply would be provided. 
This was not the case, as can be observed at Adit Tunnel A5, where the supply of 
power is inconsistent, the voltage is lower than required and the supply experiences 
fluctuation. WAPDA was to supply the required power, but was unable to do so due 
to the lack of adequate infrastructure. WAPDA suggested that generators be used for 
the tunnelling equipment, but refused to pay for the diesel costs when the Chinese 
contractor bought them. The Chinese contractor decided to not use the tunnelling 
equipment and instead used a manual drill and blast method (in an unsafe manner) 
with slow progress. Ideally the contractor should be tunnelling about 4 to 5 running 
meters per day. The result of using the manual drill and blast method resulted in 
progress of only 3 running meters per day. After reviewing the slow progress, 
WAPDA has decided to pay for the diesel generator running costs.” 
 
Figure 34: Tunnelling machines parked outside of Adit tunnel A5, not being used by the contractor 
 
  
Chapter 4: Results 65 
ACCOUNT 14: “The contractor is paid per m3 of tunnel progress. The Adit 
tunnels have a 51m
2
 cross-sectional area and the Headrace tunnel is approx. 100m
2
 
cross-sectional area.” 
 
Figure 35: Adit Tunnel A6 
 
Figure 36; Tunnel face of Adit A6 
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ACCOUNT 15: “During floods in 2010, the access between Muzaffarabad city 
and C1 were damaged and no access was available for staff between July and 
August. The cost of the project is estimated as approx. USD$1 Million per day 
according to MWH and Norplan consultant executives, given a 93 month 
construction period in the contract and a USD$2.9 Billion cost for the total project. 
This two month delay created inconsistency in the work and resulted in the 
contractor sending Chinese labour workers back to China. The returning labour 
workers were different personnel with varying degrees of skills and required re-
training. This added cost and time delay to the project as well.” 
 
Figure 37: Large landslide en-route of Site C2 
  
Chapter 4: Results 67 
 
Figure 38: Damaged homes after the 2010 flooding of the area 
ACCOUNT 16: “Experts in the field are mostly ex-pats on the project, but due 
to security reasons and low standard of living conditions, spend very little time at the 
project site.” 
ACCOUNT 17: “The Water and Power Development Authority (WAPDA) paid 
the local government of Azad Jammu Kashmir in full payment for the purchase of 
project land and compensation for local residents. Acquisition of the land had taken 
too long due to various reasons, resulting in the design team of the Nauseri Dam 
changing the design location of the dam to be within the purchased land area. This 
had significant impacts on the design work.” 
 
Figure 39; Construction of the dam wall in 2012 
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ACCOUNT 18: “Due to a combination of high poverty levels in the area and 
the constructor not disposing of waste materials properly, the shotcrete chemical 
tanks used for lining the inside of Adit tunnels was being used as water tanks by 
locals. The shotcrete chemicals contain highly toxic ingredients that the locals are 
unaware of and the contractor is doing nothing about.” 
 
Figure 40: Locals living poor conditions 
4.4 IDENTIFIED POLITICAL RISKS 
Based on the above detailed project study and the specific project accounts, it 
can be determined that there are a number of political risks apparent on the Neelum 
Jhelum Hydroelectric project – some which have already caused an effect on the 
cost, time and performance. 
Before analysing these risks in detail in the next Chapter, this section attempts 
to interpret and categorise the identified political risks. Below is a detailed 
interpretation of the impact of each risk on NJHP, the affected parties and the 
identified political risk. 
RISK 1: The location of the project sites are spread over three remote areas in a 
disputed region of Pakistan. These remote locations offer low living standards and 
lack big city facilities. This situation has caused local skilled engineers to refrain 
from moving to the site for work. This creates an impact on project’s cost and 
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performance. The parties that are affected by this situation include the client, the 
consultants and the contractor. The identified political risk in this case is that the 
local Government is too small to develop large city infrastructure. 
RISK 2: The contractor is originally from China and familiar with the hiring of 
Chinese labour workers and their work ethics. The contractor is obliged to hire local 
labour however, but unable to change management style, resulting in a cultural clash 
and local labour unwilling to work on the project. This creates an impact on the 
project’s cost and performance. The parties that are affected by this situation include 
the client and the contractor. The identified political risk in this case is that the 
Government attempts to improve international relations by engaging international 
firms, without an adequate impact assessment or evaluation and feedback process. 
RISK 3: There is an apparent lack of knowledge transfer within engineering 
consultancies, resulting in a higher ratio of aged (older) workers. This creates an 
impact on the project’s cost and performance. The parties that are affected by this 
situation include the client and the consultants. The identified political risk is that the 
Government does not mandate superannuation and does not offer medical and other 
assistance to non-government employees on retirement. 
RISK 4: Large infrastructure projects require extensive testing and analysis, 
but due to the higher safety risks and remote area living conditions, foreign experts 
refuse to work, resulting in the incompletion of required testing and analysis. This 
creates an impact on project’s cost, time and performance. The parties affected by 
this situation include the client, consultants and contractor. The identified political 
risk in this situation is the inability of the Government to control the countries 
perception in foreign media activity. 
RISK 5:  Due to the lack of local expertise, higher safety risks and remote area 
living conditions, ex-pats demand higher than normal pay, better insurance and 
higher security measures. This creates an impact on project’s cost and time. The 
parties affected by this situation include the client and consultants. The identified 
political risk in this situation is the inability of the Government to control the 
countries perception in foreign media activity. 
RISK 6: The relevant local authority of the project areas were paid in advance, 
to acquire the land necessary for the project works. This was improperly distributed 
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leading to court cases with local residents. These residents cannot be removed 
forcefully and in some cases have caused a redesign of the project. This creates an 
impact on the project’s cost, time and performance. The parties affected by this 
situation include the client and the contractor. The identified political risk is that the 
local Government makes improper use of financial resources. 
RISK 7: The client pays for compensated fuel prices, but due to the remote 
location of the project and transportation provided by private sub-contractors, fuel 
prices rise similar to the rest of the nation. This creates an impact on project’s cost. 
The parties affected by this situation include the client and the contractor. The 
identified political risk includes the change in Government import and export 
policies, change in Government taxes and fluctuation of local currency. 
RISK 8: The original contract bid specifies amount of manufactured materials, 
such as cement and steel. A rise in prices of manufactured materials results in an 
overall cost increase to the client. This creates an impact on the project’s cost. The 
parties affected by this situation include the client. The identified political risk 
includes the change in Government import and export policies, change in 
Government taxes and fluctuation of local currency. 
RISK 9: The project is assisted by facilitators chosen by the local government. 
Since there is no required assessment or evaluation, the local government assigns 
these persons due to political relations, resulting in facilitators that have no 
experience or knowledge of the project or its importance. This creates an impact on 
the project’s performance. The parties affected by this situation include the client, 
consultants and the contractor. The identified political risk is that the local 
Government prioritises internal short-term goals. 
RISK 10: The facilities provided for project use are limited and not subject to 
internal audits for correct use, resulting in local workers using project facilities 
inappropriately (e.g. for personal use). This creates an impact on the project’s cost 
and performance. The parties affected by this situation include the client. The 
identified political risk is that the Government is unable to tackle the abundance of 
poverty within the country by providing basic necessary welfare/infrastructure, 
causing corruption. 
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 RISK 11: Consumable items, such as fuel, is managed by site managers and 
not audited. These consumable items are often stolen. This creates an impact on the 
project’s cost. The parties affected by this situation include the client. The identified 
political risk is that the Government is unable to tackle the abundance of poverty 
within the country by providing basic necessary welfare/infrastructure, causing 
corruption. 
RISK 12: The client is required to provide stable and continuous power supply 
to the contractor, but has been unable to do so. This has resulted in frequent power 
outages and fluctuations or improper voltage at the construction site. This creates an 
impact on the project’s time and performance. The parties affected by this situation 
include the contractor. The identified political risk is that the Government has 
inadequate infrastructure to fulfil project requirements. 
RISK 13: The remote site location in Pakistan requires several project specific 
transport access areas, other than those managed by the National Highway Authority 
(NHA). These are outlined in the contract for the contractor, but are not being built to 
required design. This creates an impact on the project’s cost, time and performance. 
The parties affected by this situation include the client and the contractor. The 
identified political risk is that the clients’ management has inadequate auditing 
capability. 
RISK 14: Given that the project design was not finalised before the contractor 
was hired in this project and that during the project, the President of the country 
purchased Tunnel Boring Machines (TBMs) and prioritised a feasibility study to 
expedite progress – there resulted an inconsistent work flow. To save costs, the 
contractor sent ex-pat labour back to China, resulting in the need for re-training when 
new labour arrived. This creates an impact on the project’s cost, time and 
performance. The parties affected by this situation include the client, consultants and 
constructor. The identified political risk is that Government intervention is not 
managed through a project management process. 
RISK 15: Due to the nature of the project, the location is in a mountainous 
region with steep gradients and recurrent seismic activity. This consequence is 
frequent landslides resulting in broken/unusable roads and bridges in the area. The 
National Highway Authority (NHA) that is funded by the World Bank is responsible 
for the maintenance and development of these road and bridges. However, due to the 
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landslides being so frequent, development is not prioritised and maintenance is 
inadequate. This creates an impact on the project’s time and performance. The 
parties affected by this situation include the client and contractor. The identified 
political risk is that the regulatory authority does not have common interests with the 
project. 
RISK 16: During 2010, severe floods affected the project area, damaging the 
majority of existing infrastructure and stopped works on two out of the three project 
sites for over 2 months, with no information on when work can re-commence. This 
creates an impact on the project’s cost and time. The parties affected by this situation 
include the client, consultants and contractor. The identified political risk is that the 
Government has no mitigation or revival plans for a major natural disaster. 
RISK 17: A lack of co-ordination and proper communication between the 
client and the contractor was demonstrated when the client was unable to supply 
stable and continuous power supply for the contractors tunnelling equipment and 
indicated that diesel generators could be used instead. The contractor purchased 
diesel generators but found out later that the client was not prepared to pay for the 
diesel costs. This resulted in the contractor choosing a manual method for tunnelling 
and not using the correct tunnelling equipment. This creates an impact on the 
project’s cost and time. The parties affected by this situation include the client, 
consultants and contractor. The identified political risk is that the client’s 
management does not have the ability to handle inadequacy in Government 
infrastructure.  
RISK 18: The maintenance work for repair and re-build of roads and bridges is 
completed by a local contractor hired by the local Government that has no or little 
knowledge of project requirements, leading to inadequate designs. This creates an 
impact on the project’s time and performance. The parties affected by this situation 
include the client and contractor. The identified political risk is that the local 
Government prioritises internal short-term goals. 
RISK 19: Due to the Indus Water Treaty that Pakistan is obliged to, the 
Government hired the contractor before the consultant, to ensure that Pakistan 
received the water rights from the Neelum River and to improve international 
relations with China. This resulted in an immediate delay, as the consultant was hired 
several months after the contractor. This creates an impact on the project’s time. The 
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parties affected by this situation include the client, consultants and contractor. The 
identified political risk in this case is that the Government attempts to improve 
international relations by engaging international firms, without an adequate impact 
assessment or evaluation and feedback process. 
RISK 20: Due to the lack of trust in the capability of local consultancies, 
international investors and the local authority hired a consortium of five consultants 
for this project, resulting in unnecessary delays on agreement of design. This creates 
an impact on the project’s cost, time and performance. The parties affected by this 
situation include the client, consultants and contractor. The identified political risk in 
this situation is the inability of the Government to control the countries perception in 
foreign media activity. 
With reference to Section 2.4 the risks that have been interpreted can be 
categorised into the formally published categories as shown in Table 9: Identified 
Political Risks below. 
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Table 9: Identified Political Risks 
NJHP 
RISK 
Description (Root 1972) (Lloyd 1974) (Schmidt 1986) (Tsai and Su 2005) 
(Jamil, Mufti and 
Khan 2008) 
Risk 1 
the local Government is too small to 
develop large city infrastructure 
Operational Risk: 
Local Content 
Requirements 
N/A 
Horizontal + Type 1 
Investment + Operational 
Risk = Medium Political 
Risk 
Micro-Risk: Project 
Development Policy 
N/A 
Risk 2 
that the Government attempts to 
improve international relations by 
engaging international firms, without an 
adequate impact assessment or 
evaluation and feedback process 
Ownership-
Control Risk 
New 
International 
Alliances 
Horizontal + Type 1 
Investment + Ownership-
Control Risk = Medium 
Political Risk 
Macro-Risk: Foreign 
Enterprise Policies 
N/A 
Risk 3 
the Government does not mandate 
superannuation and does not offer 
medical and other assistance to non-
government employees on retirement 
Ownership-
Control Risk: 
Economic Sector 
Limitations 
N/A 
Horizontal + Type 1 
Investment + Ownership-
Control Risk = Medium 
Political Risk 
Macro-Risk: Macro-
economic Practices 
N/A 
Risk 4 
the inability of the Government to 
control the countries perception in 
foreign media activity 
N/A N/A N/A 
Macro-Risk: Political 
and Social Systems 
N/A 
Risk 5 
the inability of the Government to 
control the countries perception in 
foreign media activity 
N/A N/A N/A 
Macro-Risk: Political 
and Social Systems 
N/A 
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NJHP 
RISK 
Description (Root 1972) (Lloyd 1974) (Schmidt 1986) (Tsai and Su 2005) 
(Jamil, Mufti and 
Khan 2008) 
Risk 6 
the local Government makes improper 
use of financial resources 
N/A 
Vested interests 
of local business 
groups 
N/A 
Macro-Risk: Political 
and Social Systems 
Payment Delays 
Risk 7 
the change in Government import and 
export policies, change in Government 
taxes and fluctuation of local currency. 
Transfer Risk: 
Tariffs on Import 
and Export 
N/A 
Horizontal + Type 1 
Investment + Transfer Risk 
= Medium Political Risk 
Macro-Risk: Foreign 
Enterprise Policies 
Changes in Laws 
and Regulations 
Risk 8 
the change in Government import and 
export policies, change in Government 
taxes and fluctuation of local currency. 
Transfer Risk: 
Tariffs on Import 
and Export 
N/A 
Horizontal + Type 1 
Investment + Transfer Risk 
= Medium Political Risk 
Macro-Risk: Foreign 
Enterprise Policies 
Changes in Laws 
and Regulations 
Risk 9 
the local Government prioritises internal 
short-term goals 
N/A 
Vested interests 
of local business 
groups 
N/A 
Macro-Risk: Political 
and Social Systems 
Delays in 
approvals and 
permits from 
government 
Risk 10 
the Government is unable to tackle the 
abundance of poverty within the country 
by providing basic necessary 
welfare/infrastructure, causing 
corruption 
N/A 
Social Unrest 
and Disorder 
N/A 
Macro-Risk: Macro-
economic Practices 
N/A 
Risk 11 
the Government is unable to tackle the 
abundance of poverty within the country 
by providing basic necessary 
welfare/infrastructure, causing 
N/A N/A N/A 
Macro-Risk: Macro-
economic Practices 
N/A 
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NJHP 
RISK 
Description (Root 1972) (Lloyd 1974) (Schmidt 1986) (Tsai and Su 2005) 
(Jamil, Mufti and 
Khan 2008) 
corruption 
Risk 12 
the Government has inadequate 
infrastructure to fulfil project 
requirements 
Operational Risk: 
Local Content 
Requirements 
N/A 
Horizontal + Type 1 
Investment + Operational 
Risk = Medium Political 
Risk 
Micro-Risk: Project 
Development Policy 
N/A 
Risk 13 
the clients’ management has inadequate 
auditing capability 
Operational Risk: 
Local 
Manufacturing 
Requirements 
N/A 
Horizontal + Type 1 
Investment + Operational 
Risk = Medium Political 
Risk 
Micro-Risk: Project 
Management Policy 
N/A 
Risk 14 
Government intervention is not 
managed through a project management 
process 
N/A N/A N/A 
Micro-Risk: Project 
Management Policy 
N/A 
Risk 15 
the regulatory authority does not have 
common interests with the project 
N/A N/A N/A 
Micro-Risk: Project 
Management Policy 
N/A 
Risk 16 
the Government has no mitigation or 
revival plans for a major natural disaster 
N/A N/A N/A 
Macro-Risk: Macro-
economic Practices 
Site Access 
and/or Right of 
Way 
Risk 17 
the client’s management does not have 
the ability to handle inadequacy in 
Government infrastructure 
Operational Risk: 
Local Content 
N/A 
Horizontal + Type 1 
Investment + Operational 
Risk = Medium Political 
Micro-Risk: Project 
Management Policy 
Delays in 
approvals and 
permits from 
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NJHP 
RISK 
Description (Root 1972) (Lloyd 1974) (Schmidt 1986) (Tsai and Su 2005) 
(Jamil, Mufti and 
Khan 2008) 
Requirements Risk government 
Risk 18 
the local Government prioritises internal 
short-term goals 
N/A 
Vested interests 
of local business 
groups 
N/A 
Macro-Risk: Political 
and Social Systems 
Delays in 
approvals and 
permits from 
government 
Risk 19 
that the Government attempts to 
improve international relations by 
engaging international firms, without an 
adequate impact assessment or 
evaluation and feedback process 
Ownership-
Control Risk 
New 
International 
Alliances 
Horizontal + Type 1 
Investment + Ownership-
Control Risk = Medium 
Political Risk 
Macro-Risk: Foreign 
Enterprise Policies 
N/A 
Risk 20 
the inability of the Government to 
control the countries perception in 
foreign media activity 
Ownership-
Control Risk: 
Geographic 
Limitations on 
investment 
N/A 
Horizontal + Type 1 
Investment + Ownership-
Control Risk = Medium 
Political Risk 
Macro-Risk: Political 
and Social Systems 
N/A 
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Chapter 5: Analysis 
This chapter analyses the results obtained from the Neelum Jhelum 
Hydroelectric Project (NJHP) in Chapter 4:. Initially, the identified political factors 
are compared to the risk framework identified in earlier studies such as those by 
David Schmidt (1986) and Bruce Lloyd (1974). The remaining sections then 
introduce the specific probabilistic models to be used for analysis and identify the 
objective data required. An analysis is then presented with the application of the 
probabilistic model followed by a discussion on its applicability and realism. 
5.1 POLITICAL FACTORS ANALYSIS 
There have been numerous studies on project cost overrun, performance and 
time delays that identify factors, including those with political traits, such as those in 
(Clark 1997), (Youjie 2002), (Tsai and Su 2005),(Mian and Tsoukas 2005) and 
(Azhar, Farooqui and Ahmed 2008). Section 4 presents a similar selection of risks 
that have been identified, but specifically for the Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric 
Project (NJHP). Table 9 takes the risks that were identified during the study and 
categorises them based on earlier studies that were identified in the literature review. 
Pioneering work in the area of political risks was done by Franklin Root (1972) 
who categorized political risk into, either transfer risks, operational risks or 
ownership-control risks. These broad categories were then broken down into specific 
types of political risks. Of the twenty individual political risks identified for the 
Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project, only ten risks were able to be categorised 
within Franklin Root’s work. Risk 7 and Risk 8 were categorised as transfer risks, 
where the changes in government import and export policies influenced the prices of 
fuel and manufactured materials. Both of these risks were classified as the more 
specific; tariffs on import and export. Operational risks were classified for four of the 
identified political risks on NJHP, Risk 1, Risk 12, Risk 13 and Risk 17. Lack of 
government facilities, infrastructure or the capability to provide them were the main 
reasons that all of these risks were also classified to only one type of operational risk; 
local content requirements. Finally, Risk 2, Risk 3, Risk 19 and Risk 20 were 
categorised as ownership-control risks, where the host-government policies or 
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actions inhibit some control of the local operations of the project. Two of these risks, 
Risk 2 and Risk 19 could not be further specified, however Risk 3 was categorised as 
an ownership-control risk due to economic sector limitations and Risk 20 as an 
ownership-control risk due to geographic limitations on investment. 
A different approach is taken by Bruce Lloyd (1974), who identifies political 
risks as a combination of both political and social aspects. Only six of the political 
risks identified on NJHP could be categorised into Bruce Lloyd’s work. Risk 2 and 
Risk 19 were both categorised as political risks imposed by a new international 
alliances, while Risk 6, Risk 9 and Risk 18 were all categorised as political risks 
introduced by the vested interests of local business groups. In this particular case, we 
took the assumption that local business groups may also refer to local government 
groups. Finally, Risk 10 was considered as a political risk introduced by social unrest 
and disorder – brought about by the abundance of poverty within the country. 
A broad risk rating was then obtained in column four of Table 9, by using the 
work done by David Schmidt (1986). This involved categorizing the investment as 
either horizontal, vertical or conglomerate and assigning an investment type. These 
combined with the categorisation done from (Root 1972), resulted in a risk rating. 
Given that the Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project was the production of the same 
or similar goods and services as those produced at the home countries of the 
investors, the general nature of NJHP was categorised as a Horizontal investment. 
With regards to assigning the sector of economic activity for the project, David 
Schmidt (1986) classified the primary sector to be operations by extractive industries 
or of agricultural investments. David Schmidt then classified the service sector as 
those industries that included banking, communications, transportation and utilities. 
Finally, the industrial sector included operations engaged primarily in the chemical 
or mechanical processing of raw materials or substances into new products. The 
economic activity of NJHP is partially covered in the primary sector, as it involves 
the use of natural resources, but also covered under the services sector as a utility 
service. The author believes that the most appropriate sector of economic activity for 
NJHP was the primary sector. NJHP is a non-science based project, as it does not 
require continuous introduction of new products or processes and is partially owned 
by investors from abroad and the Government of Pakistan. The combination of these 
factors results in a Type I investment. Using the political risk assessment matrix 
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provided by David Schmidt (1986), NJHP can be classified as having a Medium 
Level Risk rating for all types of identified risks – in this case, the same ten risks 
categorised by Franklin Root’s (1972) work. 
A more modern approach is used by Ming-Chih Tsai and Chin-Hui Su (2005), 
who divide all political risks into either Micro-Risks or Macro-Risks – with further 
categories also being very broad. All twenty risks identified on NJHP are categorised 
using the work done by Ming-Chih Tsai and Chin-Hui Su (2005). Risk 2, Risk 7, 
Risk 8 and Risk 19 are categorised as Macro Risks that stem from foreign enterprise 
policies. Other Macro Risks include Risk 3, Risk 10, Risk 11 and Risk 16 as those 
resulting from macro-economic practices, and Risk 4, Risk 5, Risk 6, Risk 9, Risk 18 
and Risk 20 resulting from political and social systems. Risk 13, Risk 14, Risk 15 
and Risk 17 are categorised as Micro Risks that stem from project management 
policies, while the remaining Micro Risks stem from project development policies. 
Finally, the work done by Misbah Jamil et al. (2008) is also used to categorise 
those risks identified on NJHP. Only seven of the identified risks on NJHP could be 
categorised using the work done by Misbah Jamil et al. (2008), and even then, the 
categorisation was loosely made. Risk 9, Risk 17 and Risk 18 were categorised as 
delays in approvals and permits from the government. Risk 7 and Risk 8 could be 
attributed to changes in laws and regulations, while Risk 6 was due to payment 
delays. Risk 16 was the only other risk identified on NJHP to be categorised by 
Misbah Jamil’s work, as risks due to site access and/or right of way. 
These categorisations highlight that political risks are difficult to identify and 
even more difficult to generalise, such that they can be applied elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, every single political risk identified on the Neelum Jhelum 
Hydroelectric Project could be categorised by one of more works done in this area 
earlier, proving that these risks have validity and are not only specific to the project 
studied. 
5.2 THE NEED FOR PROBABILISTIC ANALYSIS 
Disruptive events, such as those identified on the Neelum Jhelum 
Hydroelectric project can deeply affect project costs and performance. A common 
practice in activity-based costing (ABC) is to increase the variance while estimating 
the performance of the activities included in the project. (Asher 1993) performs 
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studies and concludes that this practice may be a main contributor to cost over-runs. 
There have been several new methods for risk assessment proposed in literature that 
attempt to target the lack of realism of traditional approaches, through 
epistemological and methodological approaches. R. Dillon et al. (2003) propose a 
decision-support system to allocate a budget among projects, considering technical 
and managerial risk tradeoffs and assessing the acceptability of such risks. The 
probabilistic risk analysis in this case focuses on risk acceptability. M. Gasparini et 
al. (2004) on the other hand focus on risk prevention, by providing a loop risk 
assessment approach for dynamic project management when preventative actions are 
performed during the development stage.  
Perhaps the most interesting and most applicable in this case is the probabilistic 
risk analysis approach by Jesus Palomo et al. (2007), who propose a project external 
risk model based on the project management by scenarios approach and Bayesian 
modelling and analysis, to forecast global project performance. The next section of 
this Chapter explores Bayesian modelling and how the priori and conditional 
probabilities of the identified risks on NJHP can be used to forecast the cost impact 
on the project. 
5.3 MODELLING POLITICAL RISKS FROM NJHP USING BAYESIAN 
PROBABILISTIC RISK ANALYSIS 
Two basic principles are used for the basis of the probabilistic risk assessment; 
the principle of decomposition and Bayes probabilistic principle. Under the principle 
of decomposition, a system is not assessed as a whole during the entire risk 
assessment process, but is decomposed into sub-systems on which a detailed risk 
assessment is carried out for a substantial part of the process. Now, Bayesian models 
use the old concept of conditional probability. The Bayesian model states that 
posterior probability is proportional to the priori probability and current data, 
allowing the computation of posterior probability by allocating values to priori 
probability information with new data. 
To account for the impact of various risks and their combinations, (Palomo, 
Insua and Ruggeri 2007) defines, what he calls the total gravity by: 
𝑔 =  ∑ 𝑞𝑖
∗. 𝑔𝑖 + ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑗
∗ . 𝑔𝑖𝑗 + ∑ 𝑞𝑖𝑗𝑟
∗ . 𝑔𝑖𝑗𝑟 + ⋯ + 𝑞1…𝑘
∗ . 𝑔1…𝑘
𝑖≠𝑟≠𝑗𝑖≠𝑗
𝑘
𝑖=1
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Where 𝑔𝑖 is the gravity caused by the event 𝐸𝑖 only, 𝑔𝑖𝑗is the gravity caused by 
the simultaneous occurrence of the two events 𝐸𝑖 and 𝐸𝑗 and so on. In the same way, 
𝑞𝑖1,…𝑖𝑟
∗  is the probability of a simultaneous occurrence of disruptive events 𝐸𝑖1 , … , 𝐸𝑖𝑟.  
It is outside of the scope of this research to determine the priori and 
conditional probability data for a full set of scenarios, thus the posterior probability 
of the identified risks, assuming that single risks are mutually independent are 
calculated. The advantage of this method is that whatever the choice of event 
probabilities, 𝑞𝑖(0 ≤ 𝑞𝑖 ≤ 1), 𝑖 = 1 … , 𝑛, we have that: 
0 ≤ 𝑃 (⋃ 𝑅𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
) ≤ 1 
This means that, although the data collected for the priori probabilities from 
experts may be independent of one another, the results will still be coherent. 
After consultation with experts (NESPAK consultants), the priori and 
conditional probability data that was collected for the twenty identified risks was 
separated between the three project sites, Site C1, Site C2 and Site C3. Table 10 
below presents the collected data used for the remaining analysis. 
Table 10: Priori values for the different sites 
  Priori 
for Site 
C1 
Priori 
for Site 
C2 
Priori 
for Site 
C3 
  𝑃(𝐶1) 𝑃(𝐶2) 𝑃(𝐶3) 
Risk 1 𝑅1 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Risk 2 𝑅2 0.1 0.2 0.1 
Risk 3 𝑅3 0 0 0 
Risk 4 𝑅4 0 0 0 
Risk 5 𝑅5 0.2 0.2 0.2 
Risk 6 𝑅6 0.1 0.2 0.15 
Risk 7 𝑅7 0.1 0.11 0.13 
Risk 8 𝑅8 0.12 0.2 0.2 
Risk 9 𝑅9 0 0 0 
Risk 10 𝑅10 0 0 0 
Risk 11 𝑅11 0 0 0 
Risk 12 𝑅12 0 0 0 
Risk 13 𝑅13 0.1 0.1 0.1 
Risk 14 𝑅14 0 0 0 
Risk 15 𝑅15 0.1 0.1 0.1 
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Risk 16 𝑅16 0 0 0 
Risk 17 𝑅17 0 0 0 
Risk 18 𝑅18 0.22 0.25 0.22 
Risk 19 𝑅19 0.23 0.3 0.21 
Risk 20 𝑅20 0.2 0.2 0.2 
 
The conditional probability was also separated, however this was separated as 
the different project phases; design, construction and commissioning. Table 11 below 
presents the conditional probability data. Again this data was obtained with experts 
who were working on the site. 
Table 11: Conditional probabilities for the different phases of the project 
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Risk 1 𝑅1 0 0.05 0 
Risk 2 𝑅2 0.1 0.05 0 
Risk 3 𝑅3 0 0 0 
Risk 4 𝑅4 0.05 0 0 
Risk 5 𝑅5 0.05 0 0 
Risk 6 𝑅6 0 0.05 0.2 
Risk 7 𝑅7 0 0.05 0.1 
Risk 8 𝑅8 0 0.1 0.1 
Risk 9 𝑅9 0.1 0 0.1 
Risk 10 𝑅10 0 0 0.05 
Risk 11 𝑅11 0 0.05 0.05 
Risk 12 𝑅12 0 0.05 0.05 
Risk 13 𝑅13 0 0.05 0 
Risk 14 𝑅14 0.2 0.05 0.1 
Risk 15 𝑅15 0.1 0.05 0.1 
Risk 16 𝑅16 0 0.05 0.1 
Risk 17 𝑅17 0 0.05 0.05 
Risk 18 𝑅18 0.1 0.05 0 
Risk 19 𝑅19 0.1 0.1 0 
Risk 20 𝑅20 0.2 0.2 0 
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Now, the total probability at 𝑅𝑘  can be given by: 
𝑃(𝑅𝑡𝑘 ) = ∑ 𝑃(𝑅𝑘|𝐶𝑖) ∗ 𝑃(𝐶𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
And the posterior probability can be given by: 
𝑃(𝐶𝑘|𝑅𝑘) =  
𝑃(𝑅𝑘|𝐶𝑘) ∗ (𝑃(𝐶𝑘)
∑ 𝑃(𝑅𝑘|𝐶𝑖) ∗ 𝑃(𝐶𝑖)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Computing these provided the following results in Table 12, where only results 
with non-zero values are shown: 
Table 12: Total probability and Posterior probabilities for the different sites at risk level 
 
 
 
Total 
probability 
at Risk 
Level 
Posterior 
for Site C1 
at Risk 
Level 
Posterior 
for Site C2 
at Risk 
Level 
Posterior 
for Site C3 
at Risk 
Level 
 
  𝑃(𝑅𝑡𝑘) 𝑃(𝐶1|𝑅𝑘) 𝑃(𝐶2|𝑅𝑘) 𝑃(𝐶3|𝑅𝑘) 
Risk 1 𝑅1 Construction 0.045 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Risk 2 
𝑅2 Design 0.04 0.25 0.50 0.25 
𝑅3 Construction 0.02 0.25 0.50 0.25 
Risk 5 𝑅4 Design 0.03 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Risk 6 
𝑅5 Construction 0.0225 0.22 0.44 0.33 
𝑅6 Commissioning 0.09 0.22 0.44 0.33 
Risk 7 
𝑅7 Construction 0.017 0.29 0.32 0.38 
𝑅8 Commissioning 0.034 0.29 0.32 0.38 
Risk 8 
𝑅9 Construction 0.052 0.23 0.38 0.38 
𝑅10 Commissioning 0.052 0.23 0.38 0.38 
Risk 13 𝑅11 Construction 0.015 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Risk 15 
𝑅12 Design 0.03 0.33 0.33 0.33 
𝑅13 Construction 0.015 0.33 0.33 0.33 
𝑅14 Commissioning 0.03 0.33 0.33 0.33 
Risk 18 
𝑅15 Design 0.069 0.32 0.36 0.32 
𝑅16 Construction 0.0345 0.32 0.36 0.32 
Risk 19 
𝑅17 Design 0.074 0.31 0.41 0.28 
𝑅18 Construction 0.074 0.31 0.41 0.28 
Risk 20 
𝑅19 Design 0.12 0.33 0.33 0.33 
𝑅20 Construction 0.12 0.33 0.33 0.33 
 
Now the priori at 𝑅𝑘  can be computed using the following: 
𝑃(𝑅𝑘) =  ∑ 𝑔𝑐𝑖 ∗ 𝑃(𝐶𝑖|𝑅𝑘)
𝑛
𝑖=1
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Where 𝑔𝑐𝑖 is the gravity of each risk at the different project sites, obtained from 
understanding previous impact data. Table 13 shows the results for the priori at 𝑅𝑘  
once this had been computed. 
Table 13: Gravities at the different project sites and calculated priori at the risk level 
 
 Gravity at 
Site C1 
Gravity at 
Site C2 
Gravity 
at Site C3 
Priori at 𝑹𝒌 
 
 𝑔𝑐1 𝑔𝑐2 𝑔𝑐3 𝑃(𝑅𝑘) 
Risk 1 𝑅1 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0099 
Risk 2 𝑅2 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Risk 3 𝑅3 0 0 0 0 
Risk 4 𝑅4 0.01 0.01 0.01 0 
Risk 5 𝑅5 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0099 
Risk 6 𝑅6 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.297 
Risk 7 𝑅7 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.0495 
Risk 8 𝑅8 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.0792 
Risk 9 𝑅9 0 0 0 0 
Risk 10 𝑅10 0 0 0 0 
Risk 11 𝑅11 0 0 0 0 
Risk 12 𝑅12 0 0 0 0 
Risk 13 𝑅13 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.0495 
Risk 14 𝑅14 0 0 0 0 
Risk 15 𝑅15 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.0495 
Risk 16 𝑅16 0 0 0 0 
Risk 17 𝑅17 0 0 0 0 
Risk 18 𝑅18 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
Risk 19 𝑅19 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.15 
Risk 20 𝑅20 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.0099 
 
Now, given the conditional probabilities for disruption to the project (that were 
determined with experts from NESPAK consultancy as well), the total probability for 
a disruption to the project, 𝑃(𝑑𝑝), can be computed as follows: 
𝑃(𝑑𝑝) = (𝑅1 ∩ 𝑑𝑝) ∪ (𝑅2 ∩ 𝑑𝑝) ∪ … (𝑅𝑛 ∩ 𝑑𝑝) 
=  ∑ 𝑃(𝑑𝑝|𝑅𝑘) ∗ 𝑃(𝑅𝑘)
𝑛
𝑖=1
 
Table 14 and Table 15 provide the results for the total probability of disruption: 
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Table 14: Conditional probabilities at the different project phases and calculated priori at the risk level 
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𝑷
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Risk 1 𝑅1 0 0.05 0 0.0099 
Risk 2 𝑅2 0.01 0.08 0 0.05 
Risk 3 𝑅3 0.01 0 0 0 
Risk 4 𝑅4 0.025 0.08 0 0 
Risk 5 𝑅5 0.01 0 0 0.0099 
Risk 6 𝑅6 0.001 0.06 0.001 0.297 
Risk 7 𝑅7 0 0.025 0.01 0.0495 
Risk 8 𝑅8 0.025 0.1 0.01 0.0792 
Risk 9 𝑅9 0 0.05 0.05 0 
Risk 10 𝑅10 0 0 0.01 0 
Risk 11 𝑅11 0 0 0.01 0 
Risk 12 𝑅12 0 0.025 0 0 
Risk 13 𝑅13 0 0.025 0 0.0495 
Risk 14 𝑅14 0.1 0.05 0 0 
Risk 15 𝑅15 0.05 0.1 0.001 0.0495 
Risk 16 𝑅16 0.01 0.1 0 0 
Risk 17 𝑅17 0 0.04 0.01 0 
Risk 18 𝑅18 0.1 0.04 0 0.05 
Risk 19 𝑅19 0.1 0 0 0.15 
Risk 20 𝑅20 0.1 0 0 0.0099 
 
Resulting in: 
Table 15: Total probability of disruption to the project 
Total probability of 
disruption to project 
during design phase 
Total probability of 
disruption to project 
during construction 
phase 
Total probability of 
disruption to project 
during 
commissioning 
phase 
Total probability of 
disruption to project 
𝑷(𝒅𝒑𝒅𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏) 𝑃(𝑑𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 𝑃(𝑑𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) 𝑃(𝑑𝑝) 
0.049459 0.055515 0.021087 0.126061 
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The posterior probability, that given a disruption to the project, what was the 
probability that it was due to 𝑹𝒌, can be obtained using the following: 
𝑷(𝑹𝒌|𝒅𝒑) =  
𝑷(𝒅𝒑|𝑹𝒌) ∗ 𝑷(𝑹𝒌)
∑ [𝑷(𝒅𝒑|𝑹𝒌) ∗ 𝑷(𝑹𝒌)]
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
 
Table 16 below presents these results: 
Table 16: Posterior probability of 𝑅𝑘 during different project phases 
  
Posterior Probability 
of 𝑹𝒌 during design 
phase 
Posterior Probability 
of 𝑹𝒌 during 
construction phase 
Posterior Probability 
of 𝑹𝒌 during 
commissioning 
phase 
  𝑃(𝑅𝑘|𝑑𝑝𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛) 𝑃(𝑅𝑘|𝑑𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 𝑃(𝑅𝑘|𝑑𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 ) 
Risk 1 𝑅1 0 0.008916509 0 
Risk 2 𝑅2 0.010109384 0.072052598 0 
Risk 3 𝑅3 0 0 0 
Risk 4 𝑅4 0 0 0 
Risk 5 𝑅5 0.002001658 0 0 
Risk 6 𝑅6 0.006004974 0.320994326 0.014084507 
Risk 7 𝑅7 0 0.022291273 0.023474178 
Risk 8 𝑅8 0.040033159 0.142664145 0.037558685 
Risk 9 𝑅9 0 0 0 
Risk 10 𝑅10 0 0 0 
Risk 11 𝑅11 0 0 0 
Risk 12 𝑅12 0 0 0 
Risk 13 𝑅13 0 0.022291273 0 
Risk 14 𝑅14 0 0 0 
Risk 15 𝑅15 0.050041448 0.089165091 0.002347418 
Risk 16 𝑅16 0 0 0 
Risk 17 𝑅17 0 0 0 
Risk 18 𝑅18 0.101093835 0.036026299 0 
Risk 19 𝑅19 0.303281506 0 0 
Risk 20 𝑅20 0.020016579 0 0 
 
We can then estimate the total expected project cost variance, 𝑬𝒄, by using: 
𝑬𝒄 = ∑[𝑰𝑹𝒊 ∗ 𝑷(𝑹𝒊|𝒅𝒑)]
𝒏
𝒊=𝟏
 
Where, 𝑰𝑹𝒌 , represents the impact experienced by the project in terms of cost 
per day for each risk. These values are obtained directly by observing the raw costs 
of the project. Table 17 below shows the results obtained: 
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Table 17: Impact on project and expected cost variance during different project phases 
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Risk 1 𝑅1 750000 0 6687.381789 0 
Risk 2 𝑅2 350000 3538.284235 25218.40944 0 
Risk 3 𝑅3 0 0 0 0 
Risk 4 𝑅4 750000 0 0 0 
Risk 5 𝑅5 750000 1501.243454 0 0 
Risk 6 𝑅6 750000 4503.730363 240745.7444 10563.38028 
Risk 7 𝑅7 17500 0 390.097271 410.7981221 
Risk 8 𝑅8 28000 1120.928446 3994.596055 1051.643192 
Risk 9 𝑅9 750000 0 0 0 
Risk 10 𝑅10 750000 0 0 0 
Risk 11 𝑅11 750000 0 0 0 
Risk 12 𝑅12 350000 0 0 0 
Risk 13 𝑅13 350000 0 7801.94542 0 
Risk 14 𝑅14 350000 0 0 0 
Risk 15 𝑅15 350000 17514.50697 31207.78168 821.5962441 
Risk 16 𝑅16 350000 0 0 0 
Risk 17 𝑅17 350000 0 0 0 
Risk 18 𝑅18 350000 35382.84235 12609.20472 0 
Risk 19 𝑅19 350000 106148.5271 0 0 
Risk 20 𝑅20 750000 15012.43454 0 0 
 
 
TOTAL 
(USD$/day) 184722.4974 328655.1608 12847.41784 
 
We can now take the number of days that the specific sites experienced delays 
and calculate the total cost on the project. The values provided in Table 18 below 
were derived from NJHP project timelines. Risk 7 and Risk 8 are not derived as 
delays, but rather as the number of days of the project that increases in fuel and 
manufactured materials will affect the project. 
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Table 18: Delay periods used to calculate total costs to the project 
  Days of delay due to 𝑹𝒌  
  Site 1 Site 2 Site 3 Adit 1 Adit 2 Adit 3 Adit 4 Misc. Total 
Risk 1 𝑅1 193 95 95      383 
Risk 2 𝑅2    109 124 106 75  414 
Risk 3 𝑅3         0 
Risk 4 𝑅4 193 95 95      383 
Risk 5 𝑅5 193 95 95      383 
Risk 6 𝑅6 583 444 558      1585 
Risk 7 𝑅7        2790 2790 
Risk 8 𝑅8        2790 2790 
Risk 13 𝑅13 365 136 550      1051 
Risk 15 𝑅15 365 136 550      1051 
Risk 18 𝑅18 365 136 550      1051 
Risk 19 𝑅19 193 95 95      383 
Risk 20 𝑅20        273 273 
 
Calculating the total cost would then be a multiplication of the number of days 
by the cost per day of the Risk as shown in Table 19 below. 
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Table 19: Calculation of total of cost due to 𝑅𝑘 as cost per day 
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(U
S
D
$
/d
a
y
) 
Risk 1 𝑅1 6687.382 383 2561267.2 
Risk 2 𝑅2 28756.69 414 11905271 
Risk 3 𝑅3 0 0 0 
Risk 4 𝑅4 0 383 0 
Risk 5 𝑅5 1501.243 383 574976.24 
Risk 6 𝑅6 255812.9 1585 405463375 
Risk 7 𝑅7 800.8954 2790 2234498.1 
Risk 8 𝑅8 6167.168 2790 17206398 
Risk 9 𝑅9 0  0 
Risk 10 𝑅10 0 0 0 
Risk 11 𝑅11 0 0 0 
Risk 12 𝑅12 0 0 0 
Risk 13 𝑅13 7801.945 1051 8199844.6 
Risk 14 𝑅14 0 0 0 
Risk 15 𝑅15 49543.88 1051 52070623 
Risk 16 𝑅16 0 0 0 
Risk 17 𝑅17 0 0 0 
Risk 18 𝑅18 47992.05 1051 50439641 
Risk 19 𝑅19 106148.5 383 40654886 
Risk 20 𝑅20 15012.43 273 4098394.6 
   Total 595,409,176 
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5.4 DISCUSSION 
Using the costs derived for each of the identified risks, we can graph the cost of 
each individual risk at the specific locations where the delays have occurred. Figure 
41 below shows these costs and overlays the cumulative cost over them. The total 
amounts to almost USD$596 million dollars. 
 Figure 41 also highlights the large impact of Risk 6, the unavailability of land 
for construction purposes. 
 
 
Figure 41: Cost of political risks identified on NJHP using Posterior probabilities 
A better representation of the identified risks, other than Risk 6 can be seen in Figure 
42 below. This shows that the effect of risks like Risk 1, Risk 4 and Risk 13 – that 
are facility and resource constraint risks - are negligible in comparison to risks such 
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as Risk 18 and Risk 19 – that are site-access and local government related financial 
risks. 
 
 
Figure 42: Cost of political risks identified on NJHP using Posterior probabilities – excluding risk 6, 7 
and 8 
In order to verify whether this outcome is realistic, the current projected total 
cost of the Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP) can be determined from the 
WAPDA website. This figure is shown to be USD$2.8 Billion. During the early 
stages of the project, the projected figure for the total project cost stood at USD$2.16 
Billion. We can plot these expected total costs and compare to the current spend 
including the cost due to the identified political risks. This is shown in Figure 43 
below. Say that the majority of risks on this project were identified and that their 
impact was seen to affect project cost early on, the USD$595 Million expected cost 
impact by the twenty identified risks through the probabilistic model is very realistic. 
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Figure 43: Forecast and Actual project cost 
 
Figure 44: Impact of risks on NJHP using prior probabilities 
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We can also observe the impact of each risk on the project individually from 
the priori and the posterior probabilities. Figure 44 below shows the impact of each 
risk using the calculated prior probabilities of 𝑅𝑘 . We can see that Risk 6 showed the 
greatest impact on the project, with the remaining risks all falling below USD$100 
thousand per day and only Risk 19 showing a large priori probability. 
A significant change in impact to the project is highlighted when we consider 
the impact of the identified risks in Figure 45, using the posterior probabilities. We 
can see that the impact of Risk 6, Risk 19, Risk 18, and Risk 15 have all increased. 
 
Figure 45: Impact of risks on NJHP using posterior probabilities 
This shows that if applied in the correct manner, the probabilistic model can provide 
realistic results and assist project managers in identifying the impact of various 
political risks. The research question however still remains – is it possible for project 
managers to obtain all the relevant objective data to run these models? If we look at 
the analysis that was done to obtain the above results, a majority of the information 
was derived from experts, who were on-site and had been on the project since its 
beginning. We can verify the impact that the data provided by experts, has on the 
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outcome of the model. For example, if the conditional probabilities during the 
different design phases were changed slightly as in Table 20 below:   
Table 20: Assuming a different set of conditional probabilities 
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Risk 1 𝑅1 0 0.05 0 0.0099 
Risk 2 𝑅2 0.01 0.1 0 0.05 
Risk 3 𝑅3 0.01 0 0 0 
Risk 4 𝑅4 0.025 0.1 0 0 
Risk 5 𝑅5 0.1 0 0 0.0099 
Risk 6 𝑅6 0.001 0.06 0.001 0.297 
Risk 7 𝑅7 0 0.025 0.01 0.0495 
Risk 8 𝑅8 0.2 0.1 0.5 0.0792 
Risk 9 𝑅9 0 0.05 0.05 0 
Risk 10 𝑅10 0 0 0.01 0 
Risk 11 𝑅11 0 0 0.01 0 
Risk 12 𝑅12 0 0.025 0 0 
Risk 13 𝑅13 0 0.1 0 0.0495 
Risk 14 𝑅14 0.1 0.05 0 0 
Risk 15 𝑅15 0.05 0.1 0.001 0.0495 
Risk 16 𝑅16 0.05 0.1 0 0 
Risk 17 𝑅17 0 0.04 0.01 0 
Risk 18 𝑅18 0.01 0.01 0 0.05 
Risk 19 𝑅19 0.1 0 0 0.15 
Risk 20 𝑅20 0.1 0 0 0.0099 
 
The total probability of disruption to the project, 𝑃(𝑑𝑝), would change to the 
following: 
Table 21: Total probability of adisruption to the project using the new conditional probabilities 
Total probability of 
disruption to project 
during design phase 
Total probability of 
disruption to project 
during construction 
phase 
Total probability of 
disruption to project 
during 
commissioning 
phase 
Total probability of 
disruption to project 
𝑷(𝒅𝒑𝒅𝒆𝒔𝒊𝒈𝒏) 𝑃(𝑑𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛) 𝑃(𝑑𝑝𝑐𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑖𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔) 𝑃(𝑑𝑝) 
0.036592 0.042873 0.040442 0.119906 
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Using the same costs and delays as previously, the total cost due to 𝑅𝑘  would then 
be: 
Table 22: Total cost due to 𝑅𝑘 using the new conditional probabilities 
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Risk 1 𝑅1 8659.397 383 3316549.07 
Risk 2 𝑅2 45601.17 414 18878885.52 
Risk 3 𝑅3 0 0 0 
Risk 4 𝑅4 0 383 0 
Risk 5 𝑅5 20291.32 383 7771575.754 
Risk 6 𝑅6 323333.6 1585 512483828.7 
Risk 7 𝑅7 719.3298 2790 2006930.089 
Risk 8 𝑅8 44710.61 2790 124742599.9 
Risk 9 𝑅9 0  0 
Risk 10 𝑅10 0 0 0 
Risk 11 𝑅11 0 0 0 
Risk 12 𝑅12 0 0 0 
Risk 13 𝑅13 40410.52 1051 42471456.06 
Risk 14 𝑅14 0 0 0 
Risk 15 𝑅15 64512.12 1051 67802241.69 
Risk 16 𝑅16 0 0 0 
Risk 17 𝑅17 0 0 0 
Risk 18 𝑅18 8864.337 1051 9316417.951 
Risk 19 𝑅19 143474 383 54950535.64 
Risk 20 𝑅20 20291.32 273 5539530.498 
   Total 849,280,550.9 
 
The cost as shown in Table 22 above, is now USD$849 Million as opposed to 
the more realistic USD$595 Million calculated earlier. This is where the probabilistic 
model loses its robustness and ability to assist project managers in real life. 
Although the conditional probabilities and priori probabilities were determined 
with experts, to the authors’ belief, they were at best a guess – simply due to the 
nature of political risks. This highlights the strengths and shortcomings of the 
probabilistic model for the analysis for Political risks. 
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The strengths of the model lie within the ability to predict the probability of 
disruption to a project based on a set of objective data – such as costs, delays and 
impacts to the project. This probability can then be used to determine the predicted 
cost of the disruption to the project. 
The shortcomings of the model however – is the requirement of conditional 
and priori probabilities. These probabilities cannot be considered as objective data 
and is usually derived from expert opinions. Slight errors while determining these 
probabilities results in unrealistic outcomes from the model. 
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Chapter 6: Conclusions 
In conclusion, a summary of the research findings and activities is provided 
below as well as further research recommendations that have come out of the works 
done. 
6.1 SUMMARY OF RESEARCH FINDINGS AND ACTIVITIES 
Firstly, the research identified that the current risk management procedures for 
infrastructure projects are based on the risk assessment through analysis and 
evaluation of an organisations strategic objectives based on normal (or inflated) 
circumstances. Now, it was highlighted by Jesus Palomo et al. (2007) that this 
method was no longer sufficient, and probabilistic risk analyses are needed to deal 
with external disruptive events that can deeply affect project cost, time and 
performance. This study recognised that traditionally, these external risks have been 
considered fairly informally by project managers (Tatikonda and Rosenthal 2000; 
Asher 1993). As an example, a common practice in activity-based costing is to 
increase the variance while estimating the performance of the activities included in 
the project. 
Political risk management has been a widely addressed subject since the 1970s 
(Conway 2013), but the techniques used to identify, account for and manage these 
risks have evolved significantly over the years. Jesus Palomo et al. (2007) suggested 
that globalisation of the economy, competitive markets and increasingly hazardous 
environments have forced organisations to take riskier approaches – and believes that 
external events that may abruptly change project cost, duration and performance 
need to be modelled using a probabilistic approach. This approach focuses both on 
inferences about events’ probabilities and on their impacts on project performance – 
through what Palomo calls ‘gravity models’. 
As trillions of dollars are globally invested every year, investors are interested 
to know the political risks affecting their project before their investment. Whether the 
outcomes of the forecasting models are realistic or not, serves as the significance of 
this research – assisting investors to understand how much trust to place within these 
models.  
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The specific aim of this study was to explore and identify political risks on a 
large infrastructure project in an exaggerated environment and to ascertain whether 
sufficient objective information can be gathered by project managers in order to be 
able to utilise risk modelling techniques identified above. 
The scope of this research was to test a relevant probabilistic model against 
changes that are directed from the hierarchy of control within a large infrastructure 
project. An analysis of whether the time, cost and performance parameters can be 
realistically obtained for the forecasting model, will be done on completion of the 
field study. 
During the research, extensive literature was studied that attempted to define 
political risk. In the authors view, the concepts of political risk implied three essential 
questions: 
1. What could go wrong? i.e. the identification of disruptive events and their 
potential combinations that could arise during the project. 
2. What is the likelihood? i.e. the probability of said disruptive event 
occurring. 
3. What are the consequences (or impact)? i.e. an estimation of the impact-
losses associated with the identified event – in terms of additional cost, 
time delay or lower technical performance. 
However, the author believed that these definitions lacked a sense of scope, 
especially given that ‘Politics’ is defined by the Collins English Dictionary (2000) as 
“the complex or aggregate of relationships of people in society, especially those 
relationships involving authority or power”. It seemed odd then, to only consider the 
risks faced by a firm influenced by a country or its government’s policies. The author 
believed that the relationships of people within a project or a firm should also be 
included within this definition, as they have the same potential to add risk. 
With this in mind, a new definition of political risk was defined in this 
research: 
‘Any change directed from the hierarchy of control that alters the expected 
outcome and value of a given economic action by changing the probability of 
achieving business objectives’ 
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This research identified that there exists a large number of works that have 
attempted to identify political risk factors on different types of projects, through 
either case studies of specific projects or generalised risk factors to be used when 
applying risk analysis. In as early as 1974, Bruce Lloyd (1974) attempted to 
categorise the factors that lead to social, political and economic instability, although 
he also stated that nobody could be expected to accurately predict the future in 
political and social fields and that these variables present special problems because 
the nature of political change itself is frequently difficult to anticipate, further 
complicated by the fact that what is a political risk factor for one firm is not 
necessarily of any relevance to another. 
The chosen project for study was the Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project 
(NJHP).  This large infrastructure project was carefully chosen with specific 
reference to Bent Flyvberg (2006), who stated that a carefully chosen experiment, 
case and/or experience can lead to the critical case, where one case may be able to 
provide sufficient evidence to justify an argument.  
NJHP is a run of the river hydroelectric generation project that is located in the 
vicinity of Muzaffarabad in the territory of Azad Jammu and Kashmir (AJ&K). This 
large infrastructure project diverts the Neelum river water through a tunnel, into a 
power house and out falling into Jhelum River. The NJHP was initially identified by 
the Hydro Electric Planning Organization (HEPO) of the Water and Power 
Development Authority (WAPDA) at a cost of USD$167 million in 1989. A redesign 
of the project in 2005 raised the cost to USD$935 million. The Pakistani government 
awarded the contract for construction to a Chinese consortium in 2007, and estimated 
the cost of the project to be USD$ 2.16 Billion as of 2009. The project has 
experienced significant delays, funding issues and political disputes with regards to 
the Indus River Treaty signed between India and Pakistan.  
Based on the detailed project study and the specific project accounts, twenty 
political risks were found for the Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric project – some which 
had already caused an effect on the cost, time and performance. 
Given the numerous studies on project cost overrun, performance and time 
delays that identify factors, including those with political traits, an attempt was made 
to interpret and categorise the identified political risks based on earlier studies that 
were identified in the literature review. 
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These categorisations highlighted that political risks are difficult to identify and 
even more difficult to generalise, such that they can be applied elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, every single political risk identified on the Neelum Jhelum 
Hydroelectric Project could be categorised by one of more works done in this area 
earlier, proving that the identified risks have validity and are not only specific to the 
project studied. 
The next step was to obtain objective project information and model these risks 
using a probabilistic model. Two basic principles were used for the basis of the 
probabilistic risk assessment; the principle of decomposition and Bayes probabilistic 
principle. It was outside of the scope of this research to determine the priori and 
conditional probability data for a full set of scenarios, thus the posterior probability 
of the identified risks was only used, assuming that single risks were mutually 
independent. 
By implementing the probabilistic model and costs derived for each of the 
identified risks, a total amount of almost USD$596 million dollars was determined to 
be the impact of the identified risks on the Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project 
(NJHP). In order to verify whether this outcome was realistic, the current projected 
total cost of the Neelum Jhelum Hydroelectric Project (NJHP) was determined from 
the WAPDA website. This figure was shown to be USD$2.8 Billion. During the 
early stages of the project, the projected figure for the total project cost stood at 
USD$2.16 Billion. 
Taking into account that the majority of risks on this project were identified 
and that their impact was seen to affect project cost early on, the USD$595 Million 
expected cost impact by the twenty identified risks through the probabilistic model 
was very realistic 
The research question however still remained – was it possible for project 
managers to obtain all the relevant objective data to run the probabilistic models? A 
quick look at the analysis showed that the majority of the information was derived 
from experts, who were on-site and had been on the project since its beginning.  
An quick analysis of the impact of subjectivity in the data provided by the 
experts showed that the probabilistic model loses its robustness and ability to assist 
project managers in real life – as in the example, a small change to conditional 
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probabilities during the different design phases resulted in a change of over 
USD$250 Million. 
The answer to the research problem was that, although the conditional 
probabilities and priori probabilities were determined with experts, to the authors’ 
belief, they were at best a guess – simply due to the nature of political risks. In the 
end, it seems that although the vast majority of objective data, such as costs, delays 
and impacts can be obtained objectively for the use of a probabilistic model, the 
requirement of conditional and priori probabilities from expert opinions cannot be 
considered objective data, resulting in a model that may or may not be completely 
realistic.  
6.2 FUTURE RESEARCH RECOMMENDATIONS 
A shortcoming of the probabilistic model used in this research, is the 
sensitivity of the conditional and priori probabilities used and the inability to obtain 
these values objectively. 
Future research work can be conducted the collection of trended political data 
and the impact it has had on large infrastructure projects. Using this trended data, an 
attempt to create a model that will help to better define conditional and priori 
probabilities can be used. 
Future research work can also be done by applying the same probabilistic 
model on a project in a politically stable country. The conditional and priori 
probabilities for each political risk may possibly be easier to identify. 
A lesson learnt and future recommendation for identifying political risks – is to 
obtain data from various levels in the hierarchy of control for that risk. Political risk 
data is often subjective and various points of view are required to build the whole 
picture. 
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